Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1997

Ronald J. Scarpa v. The Real Estate Appraiser
Registration and Certification Board of the
Department of Commerce of the State of Utah :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Blaine R Ferguson; Assistant Attorney General.
E.H Fankhauser; Candice Ragsdale-Pollock; Attorney for Appellant.
BLAINE R. FERGUSON (#1059) Assistant Attorney General JAN GRAHAM (#1231) Attorney
General 160 East 300 South, 5th Floor Box 140872 Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0872 Telephone:
(801) 366-0310 Attorney for Respondent
EH. FANKHAUSER CANDICE RAGSDALE-POLLOCK 243 tiast 400 South, Suite 200 Salt Lake
City, UT 84111 Telephone: (801) 534-1148 Attorneys for Petitioner
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Scarpa v. Department of Commerce, No. 970196 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/779

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEAL^

RONALD J. SCARPA,
Petitioner,
Case No. 970196-CA
vs.
THE REAL ESTATE APPRAISER
REGISTRATION AND CERTIFICATION
BOARD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE OF THE STATE OF UTAH,

Priority No. 14

Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A FINAL ORDER OF THE
REAL ESTATE APPRAISER REGISTRATION AND CERTIFICATION BOARD
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BLAINE R. FERGUSON (#1059)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (#1231)
Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor

Box 140872
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0872
Telephone: (801) 366-0310
Attorney for Respondent
E H . FANKHAUSER
CANDICE RAGSDALE-POLLOCK
243 tiast 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 534-1148
Attorneys for Petitioner

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

RONALD J. SCARPA,

;

Petitioner,
vs.
THE REAL ESTATE APPRAISER
REGISTRATION AND CERTIFICATION
BOARD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE OF THE STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

]
|
]

Case No. 970196-CA

]
]I
]

Priority No. 14

j

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A FINAL ORDER OF THE
REAL ESTATE APPRAISER REGISTRATION AND CERTIFICATION BOARD
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BLAINE R. FERGUSON (#1059)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (#1231)
Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
Box 140872
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0872
Telephone: (801) 366-0310
Attorney for Respondent
E.H. FANKHAUSER
CANDICE RAGSDALE-POLLOCK
243 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 534-1148
Attorneys for Petitioner

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

5

Events preceding the hearing

5

The Board's original Order

6

The Board's Order on Reconsideration

8

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

11

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

22

ARGUMENT

24

I

Substantial evidence supports the Board's finding that Scarpa fraudulently
claimed experience credit for appraisals on which he did not provide any
significant professional assistance
24

II

Scarpa has failed to adequately brief his challenge to the Department of
Commerce Rule requiring the preponderance of the evidence standard in
this case
31

III

Even if the Board erred in applying the preponderance of the evidence
standard, the error was harmless because the Board determined that the
proof of Scarpa's fraudulent conduct was sufficient to satisfy a clear and
convincing evidence standard
33

IV

Scarpa waived any argument that the Division did not comply with
discovery requirements

V

34

Scarpa was not prejudiced by the fact that the Division did not provide him
with Teresa Larsen's working papers
36

i

CONCLUSION
ADDENDA
ADDENDUM A
ADDENDUM B
ADDENDUM C
ADDENDUM D
ADDENDUM E
ADDENDUM F

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of the Appraiser
Board
Order on Request for Agency Reconsideration
Notice of Posthearing Conference and Entry of Nunc Pro Tunc
Order
Utah Administrative Code Rule R162-104-17 (1994)
Utah Administrative Code Rule R162-104-9 (1994)
Utah Administrative Code Rule R162-109-1 (1994)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATE CASES
Albertson's. Inc. v. Department of Emp. Security. 854 P.2d 570 (Utah App. 1993) .. 25
Alta Pacific v. Utah State Tax Com'n. 931 P.2d 103 (Utah 1997)
Ashcroft v. Industrial Commission. 855 P.2d 267 (Utah App. 1993)
Barney v. Utah Department of Commerce. 885 P.2d 809 (Utah App 1993)

3, 4
3
3, 35

Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman. 790 P.2d 587 (Utah App. 1990)

35

Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exch.. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991)

3, 4

First National Bank v. County Board of Equalization. 799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990)

.. 24

Grace Drilling Company v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989)

30

Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments. Ltd.. 754 P.2d 89 (Utah App. 1988)

30

Harken Southwest Corporation v. Board of Oil. Gas and Mining. 920 P.2d 1176
(Utah 1996)

33

Horton v. Utah State Retirement Board. 842 P.2d 928 (Utah App. 1992)

32

Jensen v. Brown. 639 P.2d 150 (Utah 1981)

25

Johnson v. Board of Review. 842 P.2d 910 (Utah App. 1992)

24

King v. Industrial Commission. 850 P.2d 1281 (Utah App. 1993)
In re Knickerbocker. 912 P.2d 969 (Utah 1996)

2
30

Morton Intern.. Inc. v. Auditing Division. 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991)

3, 34

Semeco Industries v. State Tax Comn. 849 P.2d 1167 (Utah 1993)

36

State v. Yates. 834 P.2d 599 (Utah App. 1992)
Stokes v. Board of Review. 832 P.2d 56 (Utah App. 1992)
iii

2, 4, 32
25

Union Pacific R. v. Auditing Division. 842 P.2d 876 (Utah 1992)
Vance v. Fordham. 671 P.2d 124 (Utah 1983)

2, 32
28, 29

STATE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2b-10 (Supp. 1990)

11

Utah Code Ann. § 61-2b-10 (Supp. 1991)

12

Utah Code Ann. §§61-2b-13thru 16 (Supp. 1990)

11

Utah Code Ann. § 61-2b-16 (1993)

4

Utah Code Ann. § 61-2b-27 (Supp. 1990)

31

Utah Code Ann. § 61-2b-29 (1993)

4, 28

Utah Code Ann. § 61-2b-31 (1993)

4

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-2 (Supp. 1996)

32

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13 (1993)

36

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (1993)

11

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1993)

1, 2, 3, 24, 37

Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11 (1993)

33

Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12 (1993)

33

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (1993)

33

Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3 (1996)

1

Utah Administrative Code Rule R151-46b-3 (October 1,1996)
(Effective March 4,1996)
Utah Administrative Code Rule R151-46b-10 (October 1,1996)
(Effective March 4,1996)
iv

32

5, 31

Utah Administrative Code Rule R162-104-9 (1994)

27

Utah Administrative Code Rule R162-104-17 (1994)

27

Utah Administrative Code Rule R162-109-1.1,1.3 (1994)

28

v

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

RONALD J. SCARPA,

]

Petitioner,

]
i
]

vs.
THE REAL ESTATE APPRAISER
REGISTRATION AND CERTIFICATION
BOARD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE OF THE STATE OF UTAH,

j
]
]I
]

Case No. 970196-CA

Priority No. 14

Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A FINAL ORDER OF THE
REAL ESTATE APPRAISER REGISTRATION AND CERTIFICATION BOARD
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Petitioner seeks judicial review of an order of the Real Estate Appraiser
Registration and Certification Board (the "Board") of the Department of Commerce of
the State of Utah. This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §§ 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1996) and 63-46b-16(1) (1993).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Is the Board's finding that Scarpa fraudulently claimed experience credit

for appraisals on which he did not provide any significant professional assistance

-1-

supported by substantial evidence?
Standard of Review: This is a factual issue. The Board's finding should be
affirmed if the Court determines it is "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in
light of the whole record before the court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1993);
accord King v. Industrial Comm'n. 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. 1993).
2.

Has Scarpa adequately briefed his argument challenging the Department

of Commerce rule requiring the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in this
case?
Standard of Review: A party must adequately brief an issue with argument
and citations to authority. Appellate courts routinely decline to consider arguments
which are not adequately briefed. Rule 24(a)(9), Utah R. App. P.; State v. Yates. 834
P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992). "[CJourts should uphold agency rules if they are
reasonable and rational," and will employ an intermediate standard (one of some, but
not total, deference) in reviewing claims that an agency erred in applying its rules.
Union Pacific R. v. Auditing Div.. 842 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1992).
3.

Even if the Board erred in applying the preponderance of the evidence

standard, was the error rendered harmless by its determination that the proof of
Scarpa's fraudulent conduct also was sufficient to satisfy a clear and convincing
evidence standard?
Standard of Review: Even if an agency has erred, the appellate court may
grant relief only if the person seeking judicial review was "substantially prejudiced" by
that error. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1993). Under this standard, an error will be
-2-

harmless if it is sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that
the error affected the outcome of the proceeding. Morton Intern.. Inc. v. Auditing
Division. 814 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 1991). An error is harmful only if the likelihood of a
different outcome is sufficiently high as to undermine the Court's confidence in the
outcome. Alta Pacific v. Utah State Tax Com'n. 931 P.2d 103, 116 (Utah 1997), citing
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 P.2d 789, 796 (Utah 1991).
4.

Did Scarpa waive the argument that the Division did not comply with

discovery requirements?
Standard of Review: In order to preserve an issue for appeal, a party must
make specific and timely objections to the administrative agency. Barney v. Utah Dept.
of Commerce. 885 P.2d 809, preserve an issue for appeal, he has waived that issue.
Barney. 885 P.2d 809; Ashcroft v. Industrial Comm'n. 855 P.2d 267, 268-69 (Utah App.
1993).
5.

Was Scarpa substantially prejudiced because the Division did not provide

him with Teresa Larsen's working papers?
Standard of Review: An appellate court may not grant relief from an order of a
state agency unless the person seeking judicial review was "substantially prejudiced" by
any of several specified types of error. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1993). Under
this standard, an error will be harmless if it is sufficiently inconsequential that there is no
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceeding. Morton
Intern.. Inc. v. Auditing Div.. 814 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 1991). An error is harmful only if
the likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high as to undermine the Court's
-3-

confidence in the outcome. Alta Pacific v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 931 P.2d 103, 116
(Utah 1997), citing Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 P.2d 789, 796 (Utah 1991).1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following are of central importance to this appeal.
1.

. . . [A]n original certification may only be issued to a person
who is of good moral character.... Utah Code Ann. § 6 1 2b-16(1)(1993)

2.

The board shall require and pass upon proof necessary to
determine the honesty, competency, integrity, and
truthfulness of each applicant. Utah Code Ann. § 61 -2b16(2) (1993)

3.

The following acts and omissions shall be considered
grounds for disciplinary action: (1) procuring or attempting to
procure registration or certification under this chapter by
fraud or by making a false statement, submitting false
information, making a material misrepresentation in an
application filed with the division
Utah Code Ann. § 612b-29(1)(1993)

4.

If, after the hearing, the board determines that the registrant
or certificate holder has violated this chapter, his registration
or certificate may be suspended, revoked, or denied
reissuance by written order of the board. Utah Code Ann. §
61-2b-31(2)(1993)

5.

Standard of Proof. The standard of proof in all proceedings
under these rules, whether initiated by a notice of agency
action or request for agency action, shall be a

Mn his Summary of the Argument, Scarpa states that "additional witnesses for
the defense were not allowed to testify" regarding various matters. (Scarpa's Brief at
28). He makes no citation to the record, cites no authority, and does not discuss this
anywhere else in his brief. Scarpa has thus failed to properly raise this as an issue and
the Court should disregard it. State v. Yates. 834 P.2d 599 (Utah App. 1992).
-4-

preponderance of the evidence. Utah Administrative Code
Rule R151-46b-10(8) (October 1, 1996) (Effective March 4,
1996).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Events preceding the hearing
On April 10, 1992, Scarpa obtained a license to act as a registered real estate
appraiser from the State of Utah, Department of Commerce, Division of Real Estate
(the "Division")(R. 1182 at 17-19; R. 1222 at 17-21). On November 9, 1994, he
submitted an application to the Division to become a certified residential appraiser (R. 2
at If 5; R. 10 at 1f 1; Exhibit 2).
On February 14,1995, the Division commenced a formal adjudicative
proceeding against Scarpa by filing before the Board a petition seeking denial of his
application to become a certified residential appraiser and revocation of his license to
act as a registered appraiser (R. 1-6). The Division alleged that in submitting that
application, Scarpa claimed experience credit for appraisals performed by other
appraisers and on which he had minimal or no active participation (R. 1-6). It also
alleged that he caused records to be falsified to create the impression that he had
performed such appraisals, rather than the appraiser who had actually performed them
(R. 1-6). The Division served Scarpa with the petition and a notice of agency action (R.
6-9).
Scarpa filed a reply, opposing the relief requested (R. 10-12). On July 28,1995
and August 11,1995, he filed a motion and supplemental motion to dismiss the
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proceeding on various procedural grounds (R. 16-17, 32-34). The Board denied those
motions on January 26, 1996 (R. 91-97).
The Board's original Order
On September 9-10,1996, a formal hearing was held before the Board. The
Board was assisted by J. Steven Ekiund, Administrative Law Judge for the Department
of Commerce. (R167-174.) On October 29, 1996, the Board issued Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and an Order (the "original order"), ordering that Scarpa's
application for licensure as a certified residential appraiser be denied and that his
license as a registered appraiser be revoked (R167-174). This original order is
attached as Addendum "A."
The Board found that in applying to become a certified residential appraiser,
Scarpa claimed experience credit for five appraisals performed by Teresa Larsen, with
the help of Gerald Higgs (R. 167-74). Larsen and Higgs were appraisers affiliated with
Appraisal Professionals, a company owned by Scarpa (R. 167-68). The Board found
that although Scarpa provided some assistance and supervision to Larsen, he did not
provide significant professional assistance such as would entitle him to claim such
experience credit (R. 167-74). The Board found that the appraisal reports sent to the
lenders accurately reflected Larsen as the appraiser who had conducted those
appraisals, but that Scarpa instructed Larsen to prepare an additional copy of each
appraisal report (R. 167-74). It found that Scarpa instructed Larsen to delete her own
name and signature from that extra copy, and to reflect Scarpa's name and signature
as the appraiser who performed those appraisals (R. 167-74). The Board found that
-6-

Scarpa required the preparation of this extra copy, and signed it, to subsequently claim
credit for having performed those appraisals (R. 167-174).
The Board also found that Scarpa claimed experience credit for three appraisals
performed by Bruce Warburton and Gerald Higgs (R. 169-74). Warburton was a
registered appraiser affiliated with Scarpa's company (R.169). The Board found that
although Scarpa provided some assistance and supervision to Warburton, he did not
provide significant professional assistance such as would entitle him to claim such
experience credit (R. 169-74). The Board found that Scarpa directed Warburton to
prepare those three appraisal reports so as to reflect that he had joined Warburton and
Higgs in conducting those appraisals (R. 169-174).
The Board also found that Scarpa engaged in this type of practice so frequently
that there was a lack of evidence that he had performed and could properly claim credit
for any of the appraisals for which he sought credit on his application for certification (R.
170).
The Board concluded, based on a preponderance of the evidence, that Scarpa
devised a fraudulent scheme in an attempt to obtain licensure as a certified residential
appraiser, and had thus not established that he possessed the necessary honesty,
integrity and truthfulness to qualify for such licensure (R. 170-171).
The Board concluded that Scarpa submitted false information to the Division by
improperly seeking credit for experience on at least eight appraisals when he had not
provided significant professional assistance in those appraisals (R. 171). The Board
concluded that Scarpa engaged in a course of fraudulently devious conduct by creating
-7-

false copies of appraisals performed by registered appraisers in his employ to
subsequently claim experience credit for those appraisals (R. 171). It found that
Scarpa prompted the submission of appraisal reports to lenders which did not reflect
his participation, but later claimed that he was involved in those appraisals for purposes
of obtaining experience credit (R.172). It found that Scarpa created false copies of
appraisals and submitted information to the Division which did not reflect the appraisers
who had provided significant professional assistance on those appraisals (R.172). The
Board concluded that Scarpa engaged in unprofessional conduct in the practice of real
estate appraising which constituted dishonesty and fraud, and that his license to act as
a registered appraiser should be revoked (R. 170-73).

The Board's Order on Reconsideration
Scarpa submitted a request for reconsideration of the Board's order (R175-220).
Following the submission of memoranda by the parties (R175-220, 224-253, 256-294),
the Board issued an Order on Request for Agency Reconsideration (the "order on
reconsideration"), bearing an effective date of February 27,1997 (R. 295-304). This
order is attached as Addendum "B." As part of its order on reconsideration, the Board
entered supplemental findings of fact, modified findings of fact, and additional
conclusions of law, which are summarized below (R. 295-304). The Board reaffirmed
the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in its first order to the extent they
were not modified by the order on reconsideration (R. 295-96). The Board did not
modify the sanction contained in its original order (R. 295-304).
-8-

The Board determined that it erred in finding in its original order that Scarpa
failed to conduct or provide significant professional assistance on any of the appraisals
listed on his experience documentation form (R. 296-97; R.302-303). It concluded that
it should not have made such a finding regarding any appraisals other than the Teresa
Larsen and Bruce Warburton appraisals (R. 296-97). It thus limited its order to those
eight appraisals (R. 295-304). It rejected Scarpa's implicit assertion that there was any
evidence the Board was biased against him in this proceeding (R. 303).
The Board concluded that the evidentiary standard it should use was the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard as prescribed by Department rule, but found
that the Division also met the "clear and convincing evidence" standard in prevailing in
the case (R. 295-304). It found that this latter standard was satisfied by Scarpa's own
testimony at the hearing, which established that he submitted false statements to both
lending institutions and the Division for varying purposes. (R. 299).
The Board found that "significant professional assistance," while not defined by
statute or rule, is a well recognized and commonly understood standard in the appraisal
industry, that members of the appraisal profession can be properly held to understand
the various standards of performance which govern all appraisals, and that the Board is
entitled to apply and interpret that standard of performance in the process of
administrative adjudication (R. 299-300). It found that Scarpa did not provide significant
professional assistance so as to claim credit for having performed any of the eight
appraisals in question (R. 296).

-9-

The Board found that Scarpa knowingly and intentionally misrepresented that he
had conducted a complete inspection of the properties appraised by Larsen (R. 296).
The Board concluded that Scarpa had ample opportunity to obtain access to
Larsen's working papers both prior to and during the hearing, and that the fact that the
Division did not provide him with those papers caused him no prejudice (R. 300). The
Board said this conclusion was further supported by the fact that Scarpa's own
admissions formed the lynchpin on which its original order was based (R. 300).
The Board concluded that Scarpa devised a fraudulent scheme, creating false
copies of appraisals in an attempt to obtain licensure as a certified residential appraiser
(R. 301). This led the Board to further conclude that whether Scarpa knew how to
document his experience was not an issue (R. 301).
Finally, the Board concluded that Scarpa was afforded a fair opportunity to
present evidence which was neither repetitive nor cumulative, and was not improperly
limited in his ability to present evidence (R. 303).
On March 12, 1997, following a motion made by the Division, the Administrative
Law Judge entered a nunc pro tunc order correcting a clerical error regarding the date
the October 29, 1996 order would become effective, the date of the order on
reconsideration, and the deadline for filing a petition for judicial review (R305-309).
That nunc pro tunc order is attached as Addendum "C.M

-10-

On March 27, 1997, Scarpa filed the petition for review now pending before this
Court.2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Utah Real Estate Appraiser Registration and Certification Act (the "Act"),
which became effective July f, 1990, provided for an entry-level license designated as
"state-registered appraiser." Utah Code Ann. § 61-2b-10 (Supp. 1990). Higher levels
of licensure designated as "state-certified residential appraiser" and "state-certified
general appraiser" were made available to state-registered appraisers who attained
certain levels of experience and fulfilled other requirements. Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-2b13 through 16 (Supp. 1990). These license classifications have continued to the
present date.
A 1991 amendment to the Act placed some limitations on the kinds of appraisals
a registered appraiser could perform. For example, a registered appraiser could not

2

Under Department rules, the final agency action in this case was the Board's
order on reconsideration, which modified the original order in some ways and otherwise
reaffirmed it and incorporated it by reference. Utah Administrative Code Rule R.15146b-13 (3) (October 1, 1996) (Effective March 4,1996). On pages 4 and 5 of his brief,
however, Scarpa states that he is seeking review of the Board's original order, its order
on reconsideration, his own request for agency reconsideration, and the Division's
response. This court should disregard Scarpa's effort to seek review of anything other
than the final agency action. His request for reconsideration, the Division's response,
and those parts of the Board's original order which were changed on reconsideration
are not a proper subject of the pending petition for review, because they are not part of
the final agency action. Only the final agency action is subject to judicial review. Utah
Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-14(1); 63-46b-16(1) (1993). The Court should ignore statements
in Scarpa's brief (such as on pages 11-12) criticizing parts of the Board's original order
which it later changed after reconsideration.

-11-

perform appraisals exceeding a certain dollar amount, and could not issue a certified
appraisal report. Utah Code Ann. § 61-2b-10 (Supp. 1991). These limitations continue
to the present date.
Scarpa became a state-registered real estate appraiser on April 10, 1992 (R.
1182 at 17-19; R. 1222 at 17-21). He became the original owner, as well as the
president, of Appraisal Professionals, a company providing appraisal services (R. 1222
at 22 through R. 1223 at 5; R. 1333 at 20 through R. 1334 at 6.) He contracted with a
certified general appraiser, Gerald Higgs, to act as a certified appraiser for Appraisal
Professionals (R. 1445 at 17 through R. 1447 at 7).
In late December 1992, the Division was contacted by Teresa Larsen, a
registered appraiser who had recently been working for Appraisal Professionals.
Larsen told the Division she was concerned that Scarpa would try to claim her
appraisals for credit on a future application to become a certified appraiser (R. 1178 at
13-23). Larsen identified five specific appraisals on which she thought this might
happen (R. 1178 at 24 through R. 1179 at 8).
The Division then monitored the certification applications it received, watching for
an application from Scarpa (R. 1179 at 9-14). On November 9, 1994, the Division
received from Scarpa an application for certification as a certified residential appraiser.
As part of his application, Scarpa included an experience documentation form claiming
to have performed appraisals on the five properties Larsen had identified as properties
she had appraised while working for Scarpa (Exhibit 2; R. 1179 at 14-21). The
experience documentation form, signed by Scarpa and acknowledged before a notary,
-12-

contains the following statement:
Under penalty of perjury, I attest that the information contained on this
form is true. I understand that I may be required to substantiate the
experience claimed by submitting written reports or file memoranda, and
that willfully submitting false information can result in license revocation
and/or criminal prosecution.
(Exhibit 2).
Following an investigation, the Division filed a petition against Scarpa, alleging
that in submitting that application, Scarpa claimed experience credit for appraisals
actually done by other appraisers, and on which he had minimal or no active
participation (R. 1-9). The Division alleged that Scarpa failed to meet the criteria of
honesty, integrity and truthfulness which are required for certification (R. 3-4). It alleged
that Scarpa was also subject to disciplinary action for attempting to procure certification
by fraud or by making a false statement, submitting false information, or making a
material misrepresentation in his application (R. 4). The petition asked the Board to
deny Scarpa's application to become a certified residential appraiser, and to revoke his
license to act as a registered appraiser (R. 4-5).
At the hearing on the petition, the Division showed that Larsen had worked for
Appraisal Professionals in November and December of 1992 (R. 1086 at 2-15). She
performed appraisals on five properties while working there:
2086 E. Kramer Drive, Sandy, Utah. Larsen performed the work on this
appraisal, with the assistance of Gerald Higgs (R.1087 at 23 through R. 1088 at 1).
She did not recall Scarpa doing any work on the appraisal (R. 1089 at 2-3). Before she
finished the appraisal report, Scarpa instructed her to prepare an extra copy of the
-13-

appraisal report, to delete her name, and to add Scarpa's name and a place for him to
sign (R. 1088 at 2 through R. 1089 at 1). The appraisal report on this property which
was submitted to the lender is Exhibit 14. It is signed by Larsen and Higgs. The extra
copy Larsen prepared for Scarpa is Exhibit 16. It is signed by Scarpa and Higgs.
1995 East Rua Branco Circle, Sandy, Utah. Larsen performed the work on
this appraisal, with the assistance of Higgs (R. 1093 at 9-18). To her knowledge,
Scarpa did not do any work on that appraisal (R. 1093 at 19-21). She prepared an
extra copy of this appraisal for Scarpa's signature, as she had been previously
instructed (R. 1093 at 22 through R. 1094 at 4). Larsen's copy of the appraisal report
on this property, bearing the signatures of Larsen and Higgs, is Exhibit 3. The extra
copy Larsen prepared for Scarpa, signed by Scarpa and Higgs, is Exhibit 4.
462 West 1250 North, Centerville, Utah. Larsen performed the work on this
appraisal, with the assistance of Higgs (R. 1094 at 9-18.) To Larsen's knowledge,
Scarpa may have suggested changing the word "remodeled" in describing the kitchen
to the word "modified" (R. 1561 at 16 through R. 1564 at 3). Other than that, Larsen
had no evidence or recollection of Scarpa doing any work on that appraisal (R. 1094 at
23-25; R. 1564 at 15-20). She prepared an extra copy of this appraisal for Scarpa's
signature, as Scarpa had previously instructed her (R. 1095 at 1-7). The copy of the
appraisal report on this property which was sent to the lender is Exhibit 5. It bears only
Higgs signature. Larsen did not know why her signature did not appear on that copy
(R. 1095 at 15 through R. 1096 at 13). Larsen's personal copy of that report is Exhibit
6. It is signed by Larsen and Higgs. The extra copy Larsen prepared for Scarpa is
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Exhibit 7. It is signed by Scarpa and Higgs.
2275 West 10546 South, South Jordan, Utah. Larsen performed the work on
this appraisal, with the assistance of Higgs (R. 1096 at 14-24). Scarpa provided Larsen
with seme information from the builder (R. 1096 at 25 through 1097 at 5). He also may
have suggested rephrasing three words in a sentence in the comments section, and
changed two separate words in that same section (R. 1561 at 16 through R. 1563 at 13;
R. 1564 at 4-14). Other than that, Larsen had no evidence or specific recollection of
Scarpa performing any work on this appraisal (R. 1097 at 6-8; R. 1564 at 15-20). She
prepared an extra copy of this appraisal for Scarpa's signature, as Scarpa had
previously instructed her (R. 1097 at 9-15). The copy of the appraisal report on this
property which was sent to the lender is Exhibit 8. It is signed by Larsen and Higgs.
The extra copy Larsen prepared for Scarpa is Exhibit 10. It is signed by Scarpa and
Higgs.
876 South 2200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. Larsen performed the work on this
appraisal, with the assistance of Higgs (R. 1097 at 22 through R. 1098 at 6). Larsen
could not recall specifically Scarpa performing any work on this appraisal (R. 1098 at 710). She prepared an extra copy of this appraisal for Scarpa's signature, as Scarpa
had previously instructed her (R. 1098 at 11-17). The copy of the appraisal report on
this property which was sent to the lender is Exhibit 11 It is signed by Larsen and
Higgs. The extra copy Larsen prepared for Scarpa is Exhibit 13. It is signed by Scarpa
and Higgs.
To Larsen's knowledge, Scarpa did not see any of the properties involved in her
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five appraisals. She recalled that he probably contributed information to her or
answered general questions she may have had in performing her appraisal work (R.
1099 at 4-8). Scarpa claimed that he inspected the exterior of all five properties (R.
1273 at 4-5). He admitted, however, that he did not inspect the interior of three of the
properties, even though the copies he kept for himself and later submitted to the
Division of those three appraisals contained his signed certification that he had
inspected both the interior and exterior those properties (R. 1273 at 6-9; R. 1273 at 1021; R. 1231 at 25 through R. 1232 at 2; Exhibit 7; R. 1281 at 25 through R. 1282 at 14;
R. 1239 at 1-2; Exhibit 13; R. 1283 at 16-22; Exhibit 16; R. 1258 at 24 through R. 1259
at 9).
Larsen left Appraisal Professionals because she was uncomfortable about the
procedure involved in making the extra copy for Scarpa's signature (R. 1103 at 14-25).
She was concerned because she was being asked to delete her name from that copy
(R. 1104 at 23-25; R. 1119 at 11 through R. 1120 at 11).
Richard Bybee was a registered appraiser who worked for Appraisal
Professionals from about June 1992 to January 1993 (R. 1036 at 17 through 1038 at 5).
At the hearing, Bybee bolstered Larsen's testimony by confirming that while he worked
for Appraisal Professionals, Scarpa took credit for doing work on Bybee's appraisals,
even though he performed little or no work on those appraisals (R. 1038 at 13-19).
Bybee testified that "[Scarpa] signed all of mine. Every appraisal I did that was done for
Appraisal Professionals there was a copy made with his signature on it." (R. 1043 at
19-21). On between 20 and 50 of these appraisals, Scarpa did not see the properties
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(R. 1043 at 22 through R. 1044 at 5). Bybee was concerned about the procedure of
making an extra copy for Scarpa's signature because there came a point where in
Bybee's opinion Scarpa "wasn't even looking at the appraisals." (R. 1038 at 23 through
R. 1040 at 2, especially R. 1040 at 1-2).
Bruce Warburton was a registered appraiser who worked for Appraisal
Professionals from about September 1993 to September 1994. At the hearing, the
Division showed that while working for Appraisal Professionals, Warburton performed
three narrative appraisals:
1359 West 5930 North, Oakley, Utah. Warburton performed the work on this
appraisal, with the assistance of Higgs (R. 1134 at 20 through R. 1137 at 2; R. 1144 at
13 through R. 1145 at 4; R. 1171 at 16-18; Exhibit 19). After Warburton had compiled
all of his notes and was ready to have the appraisal sent out to be typed, Scarpa
instructed him to put Scarpa's name on the appraisal. Scarpa told him he was going to
proof the appraisal, and that would give him the involvement needed to put his name on
it. Scarpa told Warburton to do this because Scarpa was "the boss." Prior to that
point, Scarpa had nothing to do with that appraisal. Warburton followed Scarpa's
instructions, and when the appraisal was finished, he gave it Scarpa. Scarpa returned
the appraisal to Warburton later that day. Scarpa signed that appraisal. (R. 1136 at 18
through R. 1139 at 12).
98 West Center Street, Midvale, Utah. Warburton performed the work on this
appraisal, with the assistance of Higgs (R. 1139 at 13 through R. 1140 at 2; Exhibit 20).
Scarpa did not do any work on this appraisal (R. 1140 at 3-4). Pursuant to instructions

-17-

from Scarpa, Warburton put Scarpa's name on this appraisal and gave it to Scarpa to
sign. Scarpa signed it in Warburton's presence. (R. 1140 at 5-23; Exhibit 20).
548 East 12th Street, Ogden, Utah. Warburton performed the work on this
appraisal, with the assistance of Higgs (R. 1140 at 24 through R. 1141 at 17; Exhibit
21). Based on Scarpa's instructions on the previous two appraisals, Warburton added
Scarpa's name to this appraisal (R. 1141 at 21 through R. 1142 at 124). To
Warburton's knowledge, Scarpa did no work on this appraisal (R. 1142 at 4-7). Scarpa
signed this appraisal in Warburton's presence (R. 1142 at 2-3).
Scarpa presented evidence of his own, claiming he had been actively involved in
all the appraisals performed by Larsen and Warburton. He attempted to contradict or
discount the testimony of Larsen, Bybee and Warburton and to challenge their
credibility.3 Ultimately, however, the Board resolved the dispute in the testimony in
favor of the Division. It found that the Division proved by clear and convincing evidence
that Scarpa did not provide significant professional assistance on the Higgs and
Warburton appraisals as to allow him to claim credit for having performed any of them
(R. 296; R. 301).

3

Scarpa attempted during the hearing to challenge Warburton's credibility by
seeking to introduce extrinsic evidence of specific instances of alleged misconduct on
his part. Counsel for the Division objected, and the administrative law judge sustained
the objections. Scarpa then attached letters and affidavits to his request for
reconsideration containing the kind of statements to which the Division successfully
objected at the hearing. The Division objected to those letters and affidavits on
reconsideration and asked the Board to ignore them (R. 242). None of the statements
made in those letters or affidavits are mentioned in the order on reconsideration.
Scarpa has made reference to those statements in his brief. The Division has filed a
motion to strike all such references from Scarpa's brief.
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Scarpa offered a number of reasons which he claimed justified his practice of
having multiple copies of appraisals prepared, some with the signatures of one of his
registered appraisers and Higgs, and one with the signature of himself and Higgs. For
example, he said that certain lenders would only allow the certified appraiser to sign
appraisals for them (R. 1228 at 23 through R. 1229 at 6). Even when doing an
appraisal for a company that had no such requirement, however, Scarpa still had his
appraisers prepare a separate copy for his signature in addition to the copies they
signed themselves. Scarpa said there were so many lenders that it was "easier to have
one procedure in the office." (R. 1278 at 22 through R. 1279 at 10).
Scarpa also claimed that in establishing the procedure of preparing an extra
copy of appraisals which would include his signature, he was only following the advice
of Joe Dunlop, a certified general appraiser who was working for him as a consultant,
and was just trying to create a record which showed his participation in the appraisals
(R. 1276 at 10 through 1277 at 4; R. 1353 at 5-9; R. 1354 at 6-10). Dunlop testified,
however, that he never advised Scarpa to delete from the appraisal the name of any
registered appraiser from his office who had performed the appraisal (R. 1368 at 1418). Scarpa admitted that the idea of deleting the name of the other appraiser from his
copy of the appraisal was his own interpretation of Dunlop's directions (R. 1277 at 511).
The Board was not persuaded that any of Scarpa's reasons justified him in
submitting false statements to both lending institutions and the Division for varying
purposes (R. 295-304, especially R. 299). In both its initial order, and its order on
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reconsideration, the Board stated:
Significantly, the appraisal report form submitted to lenders on
those properties appraised by Ms. Larsen provides for the entry of the
name(s) of each appraiser who may have conducted any given appraisal.
If Respondent had actually joined Ms. Larsen or any other state-registered
appraiser employed by Appraisal Professionals in conducting one of the
appraisals in question, the appraisal report submitted to any given lending
institution was necessarily inaccurate if it did not reflect the fact of
Respondents significant professional assistance. Moreover, copies of
appraisal reports which Respondent submitted to the Division to thus
document his claim for experience toward certification as a state-certified
residential appraiser were also inaccurate because he did not
acknowledge the significant professional assistance provided by Ms.
Larsen or any other appraiser in each instance.
(R. 301) (Emphasis added by Board in its order on reconsideration).
At the hearing, Teresa Larsen made reference to her working files which she had
taken with her when she left Appraisal Professionals. These were files which belonged
to her (R. 1562 at 15-22) She testified on rebuttal that on reviewing her working files on
the five appraisals she performed, she found no indication that Scarpa had done any
work on three of the appraisals (R. 1561 at 22 through R. 1563 at 12). She found some
handwriting she did not recognize and said it could have been Scarpa's. Someone
having that handwriting had asked that about six words be changed on the appraisals
of the property located at 462 West 1250 North, Centerville, Utah, and 2275 West
10546 South (R. 1563 at 5 through R. 1564). She testified that she had provided these
working files to counsel for the Division several weeks before the hearing (R. 1567 at 5
through R. 1568 at 12.) She also testified that from the time she left Appraisal
Professionals in 1992 to the day she gave thosefilesto counsel for the Division, neither
the Division nor Scarpa, or anyone on their behalf, had contacted her to produce those
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files (R. 1571 at 3-16). Scarpa testified that he had known Larsen had those working
files since receiving correspondence from the Division requesting copies of those
appraisals, which would have been November 1994, almost two years before the
hearing (R. 276 at 4-15; Exhibit 17). Larsen had her working files with her during the
hearing and reviewed them to respond to a question from counsel for the Division (R.
300). The working papers themselves were neither offered nor received in evidence.
Scarpa made no objection to Larsen's testimony about what she observed on
reviewing her working files (R. 1561 at 22 through 1564 at 20). He did not request an
opportunity to review those files. Throughout the entire hearing, he never raised any
issue that the Division had allegedly violated discovery requirements by not giving him
copies of the working files it obtained several weeks before the hearing.
After the Board issued its original order and Scarpa requested reconsideration,
he claimed for thefirsttime that the Division was obligated under discovery
requirements to provide him with the Larsen working papers, and that he was
substantially prejudiced and denied due process because the Division did not provide
him with those documents (R. 177-179; R. 272-274). On reconsideration, the Board did
not address Scarpa's allegation that the Division was obligated under discovery
requirements to provide him with those papers. Instead, it considered whether or not
Scarpa had established he was prejudiced in his ability to present testimony in the case
by not having those papers prior to the hearing (R. 300). It concluded that Scarpa had
various opportunities-up to and including during the hearing itself—to obtain access to
those documents (R.300). Scarpa failed, however, to avail himself of those
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opportunities. The Board determined that since Scarpa's own admissions formed the
lynchpin on which its original order was based, Scarpa had failed to establish that he
was prejudiced by not having those documents prior to the hearing (R. 300).4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case involved a credibility contest. The Division presented evidence
showing that Scarpa submitted an application for certification in which he tried to claim
experience credit for work he did not perform. Scarpa presented evidence disputing the
Division's position. The Board believed the Division's evidence and found that the
Division had proved its case, not just by a preponderance of the evidence, but by a
showing of clear and convincing evidence. It found that Scarpa's conduct was
fraudulent, that he did not meet the criteria of honesty needed to become a certified
appraiser, and that his license as a registered appraiser should be revoked. The
Board's findings on these factual issues are supported by substantial evidence and this
Court should not disturb them.
The Board concluded that in order to receive experience credit for having

4

Scarpa asserts in his brief (on pages 13, 17, 18 and 43, for example) that
Larsen's working files contained verification that he participated in her appraisals and
would have refuted her testimony. There is nothing in the record to support this
assertion. Weeks after the hearing had been concluded and the Board had issued its
order, Scarpa attached letters and affidavits to his request for reconsideration in an
attempt to make this assertion. The Division objected to those letters and affidavits on
reconsideration and asked the Board to ignore them (R. 242). None of the statements
made in those letters or affidavits are mentioned in the order on reconsideration. Those
letters and affidavits are the subject of a motion to strike which the Division has filed
with this Court.
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performed an appraisal, an appraiser must have provided some significant professional
assistance on the appraisal. It found that Scarpa did not provide that level of
assistance on eight appraisals for which he claimed credit. Scarpa claims the Board
should have adopted a formal rule before holding him to such a standard. He is wrong.
It is not necessary to have an express rule for everything that might come before an
agency. Existing rules already contain an implicit significant professional assistance
requirement. In any event, the Board is authorized to interpret and apply standards of
performance that should be understood by members of the profession.
Scarpa's attempts to characterize the case as a mere difference of opinion about
how he should have kept records of his participation on appraisals are misguided and
irrelevant. This is not a case about the proper way to keep records of participation in
appraisals. Rather, this case is about whether Scarpa participated sufficiently in certain
appraisals to get credit in the first place. The Board found that he did not.
The Board applied a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof, as
required by Department rule. Scarpa, while acknowledging that no statutory provision
calls for a higher standard of proof, asserts that the Board should have applied a clear
and convincing evidence standard. He fails to adequately brief the point, however, and
cites no controlling authority that would support overturning the rule. In any event,
even if the Board should have applied a clear and convincing evidence standard, there
was no prejudice to Scarpa because the Board found that the proof satisfied both
standards.
Scarpa claims the Division violated discovery requirements by not providing him
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with a copy of some documents it obtained from a witness several weeks before the
hearing. By failing to timely raise that issue before the Board, however, he waived the
right to have it considered on judicial review. Furthermore, because he had ample
opportunity to timely discover that information himself from the witness early in the
course of the proceeding, and could even have reviewed that information at the
hearing, but did not, he was not prejudiced by not receiving a copy of that information
from the Division.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE BOARD'S FINDING THAT
SCARPA FRAUDULENTLY CLAIMED EXPERIENCE CREDIT FOR
APPRAISALS ON WHICH HE DID NOT PROVIDE ANY SIGNIFICANT
PROFESSIONAL ASSISTANCE
The Board's finding that Scarpa fraudulently claimed experience credit for
appraisals on which he did not provide any significant professional assistance should
be sustained by this Court as long as it is "supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g)
(1993). Substantial evidence is "that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is
adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." First Natl Bank v.
County Bd. of Equalization. 799 P.2d 1163,1165 (Utah 1990). It is more than a mere
"scintilla" of evidence and something less than the weight of the evidence. Johnson v.
Board of Review. 842 P.2d 910t 911 (Utah App. 1992).
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Appellate courts give great deference to the factual determinations of trial-level
decision makers. As long as there is sufficient evidence to support the findings of the
lower court, the appellate court will be mindful of the advantaged position of the trial
judge who sees and hears the witnesses and will therefore give due deference to his
decision. Jensen v. Brown. 639 P.2d 150, 152 (Utah 1981). This principle applies to
the decisions of trial courts and administrative agencies alike. An agency's findings of
fact are accorded substantial deference and "will not be overturned if based on
substantial evidence, even if another conclusion from the evidence is permissible."
Stokes v. Board of Review. 832 P.2d 56, 60 (Utah App. 1992)(quoting Hurley v. Board
of Review. 767 P.2d 524, 526-27 (Utah 1988). "It is the province of the Board, not
appellate courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can
be drawn from the same evidence, it is for the Board to draw the inferences."
Albertson's, Inc. v. Department of Emp. Sec. 854 P.2d 570, 575 (Utah App.
1993)(quoting Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App.
1989)).
This case presented a credibility contest to the Board. Witnesses for the Division
testified that Scarpa took credit for performing appraisals on which he had little or no
involvement. They demonstrated that in a number of cases, Scarpa caused a dual set
of appraisal records to be established. One appraisal went to the lender, showing the
names of the appraisers who actually performed the appraisal. A second version of the
appraisal deleted the name of the registered appraiser who had done the work (Teresa
Larsen) and substituted Scarpa's name. The application submitted by Scarpa to
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become a certified residential appraiser claimed experience credit for some of the
appraisals on which he had little or no involvement. The evidence offered by the
Division, if accepted by the Board as truthful, was compelling and substantial.
Scarpa, on the other hand, claimed that he had participated significantly in every
appraisal he signed.5 He tried to attack the credibility of some of the Division's
witnesses. He admitted maintaining the dual set of appraisal records, but tried to justify
his actions with various explanations. He admitted signing a certification that he had
inspected the interior of three of the properties appraised by Larsen, even though he
had admittedly not really conducted such an inspection.
After observing the witnesses and hearing their testimony, the Board believed
the Division's witnesses, and not Scarpa's. Even though it would have been sufficient
for the Board tofindthat the evidence preponderated against Scarpa, the Board found
that the evidence against him was "clear and convincing."6
Scarpa asserts that the Board should not have found his level of participation in

5

Some of the references in Scarpa's brief which purport to be references to
evidence in the record are actually citations to the memoranda he submitted in support
of his request for reconsideration. (See, for example, Scarpa's brief at page 20, where
he cites to R. 178, pages 22-23, where he cites to R. 179, and page 42, where he cites
to R. 266). The Division has made a motion to strike such references.
6

Since each appraisal for which Scarpa sought credit without having provided
sufficient participation raised a serious concern respecting his honesty, integrity,
truthfulness and moral character, the Board's finding that there were eight such
appraisals was more than enough to support its finding that Scarpa should lose his
license and be denied certification, even though his application listed hundreds of
properties. The duplicate record scheme developed by Scarpa to facilitate this process
further supported the Board's finding.
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the subject appraisals was insufficient to receive experience credit because there was
no statute or rule specifically defining the level of participation required to legitimately
claim such credit. Actually, a review of the Division's rules in effect at the time of
Scarpa's application for certification shows that even though the words "significant
professional assistance" are not expressly stated, such a standard is implicit. The
Appraisal Experience Points Schedule begins with the words "Appraisal Experience
Points Schedule. Points shall be awarded as follows...." The schedule then lists
various kinds of properties, each having a corresponding point value. Utah
Administrative Code Rule R162-104-17 (1994), attached as Addendum D. Other rules
point out that if the appraiser has done a desk review of the appraisal of the property,
he earns 20% of the points for the appraisal. If he does a field review, he earns 50% of
the points. If he supervises the appraiser, he earns 20% of the points for the appraisal.
Utah Administrative Code Rule R162-104-9 (1994), attached as Addendum E.
A reading of these rules strongly supports the Board's conclusion that in order to
earn experience credit, an appraiser must provide significant professional assistance on
an appraisal. The only cited rule which does not refer to some specific type of
significant professional assistance by the appraiser (desk review, field review, or
supervision) is the opening portion of the point schedule itself. However, since that
schedule lists the maximum points available for an appraisal, and since the rules clearly
provide that certain defined forms of participation in the appraisal will allow the
appraiser to earn fewer points, it follows that to qualify for those maximum points, an
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appraiser must provide some significant professional assistance.7
Even if the rules did not already have an implicit requirement of significant
professional assistance, it is not necessary for an agency to have a rule governing
every issue that might come before it. Case law allows the Board to make appropriate
interpretations of the rules. In Vance v. Fordham. 671 P.2d 124 (Utah 1983), the
license of an osteopathic physician had been revoked for "unprofessional conduct."
Among other things, the physician argued on appeal that it was illegal for the
Department to revoke his license for unprofessional conduct when the Department had
not published regulations defining what professional conduct was forbidden under that
standard. The Supreme Court held that the Department's decision on the meaning of
"unprofessional conduct" was within the limits of reasonableness, and upheld the
revocation of the license. The Court reasoned that as applied to the treatment of
patients, or services to clients,
[A] general statutory standard like "unprofessional conduct" is acceptable
for three reasons: (1) The subject of professional performance is too
comprehensive to be codified in detail. (2) Members of a profession can
properly be held to understand its standards of performance. (3)
Standards of performance will be interpreted by members of the same
profession in the process of administrative adjudication.
Vance. 671 P.2d at 129.

7

On page 37 of his brief, Scarpa appears to argue that the Division should have
questioned his claimed experience points in some informal manner instead of filing this
formal proceeding. He is mistaken. Since the Division was seeking to deny Scarpa's
initial certification application for a reason listed in Utah Code Ann. § 61-2b-29, and to
revoke his license to act as a registered appraiser, its rules required it to proceed by
way of a formal administrative proceeding. Utah Administrative Code Rules R162-1091.1, 1.3 (1994) attached as Addendum F.
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The principles followed by the Supreme Court in Vance also apply to this case.
The Board concluded in its order on reconsideration that the term "significant
professional assistance," while not defined by statute or rule, is a well recognized and
commonly understood standard in the appraisal industry,8 members of the appraisal
profession can be properly held to understand the various standards of performance
which govern all appraisals, and the Board is entitled to apply and interpret that
standard of performance in the process of administrative adjudication (R. 299-300).9
The Board did not adopt a new rule in deciding this case, nor did it need to.10
Instead, by applying commonly understood standards already recognized in the
appraisal industry, it found that Scarpa did not provide significant professional
assistance so as to claim credit for having performed any of the eight appraisals in
question (R. 296).11

8

The Board found that "significant professional assistance is commonly accepted
to mean that an appraiser has provided input into the final value estimate of the
property in question." (R. 300).
Accordingly, it was unnecessary for the Board to adopt the views of Scarpa's
expert witness and former consultant Joe Dunlop regarding the level of participation he
felt was necessary in order to qualify for experience credit on an appraisal. In addition,
Dunlop's credibility was damaged by his admission on cross-examination that he had
given incorrect advice to Scarpa about making an extra copy of appraisals for his
signature (R. 1364 at 19 through R. 1368 at 13, especially R. 1368 at 11-13).
10

On page 36 of his brief, Scarpa says the Board did consider the issue of
minimum criteria for participation "post decision," and refers to Addendum #3 of his
brief. Addendum #3 consists of materials which are not part of the record, are irrelevant
to this case and are a subject of the Division's motion to strike.
"Scarpa's contention that the Board needed to formally enact on a rule on the
subject before it could decide this case is incorrect. Vance. 671 P.2d at 128-30.
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In Part IV of his argument, Scarpa claims, without any citation of relevant
supporting authority, that the Board committed error by failing to make detailed findings
of the evidence it relied on to support its conclusions.12 He is incorrect. The Board's
findings of fact provide ample detail for this Court to carry out its review. It was not
necessary for the Board to itemize the specific points of evidence on which it relied, in
re Knickerbocker. 912 P.2d 969, 979 (Utah 1996). Most of Scarpa's argument on this
point consists of self-serving assertions about the comparative strength of the evidence
presented by the Division and by Scarpa. He fails to recognize that the Board saw and
heard all of the witnesses and was able to assess their credibility and consider their
testimony. He fails to recognize that it was the province of the Board determine which
witnesses to believe. Grace Drilling Company v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 68
(Utah App. 1989). The Board performed its function of weighing the evidence and
adequately explained the factual bases for its decision. This Court should ignore
Scarpa's attempts to get this Court to substitute its judgment for that of the Board in the
determination of these factual issues.
The Board's finding that Scarpa fraudulently claimed experience credit for
appraisals on which he did not provide any significant professional assistance is based

12

One case Scarpa cites is Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments. Ltd.. 754 P.2d 89
(Utah App. 1988). This was a negligence case based on injuries suffered when a
snow-covered roof collapsed. The court granted a directed verdict in favor of the
defendant, and the plaintiff appealed. Scarpa cites this case for the proposition that
"speculation and conjecture do not constitute the more 'credible evidence presented'
based on an assumed, undefined, unpublished standard or test of'significant
participation' or 'significant professional assistance.'" The case does not support
Scarpa's assertion and has nothing to do with participation on an appraisal.
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on substantial evidence and should be sustained by this Court.13

POINT II
SCARPA HAS FAILED TO ADEQUATELY BRIEF HIS CHALLENGE TO
THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE RULE REQUIRING THE
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE STANDARD IN THIS CASE
In deciding this case, the Board necessarily applied the standard of proof
required by the rules of the Department of Commerce: T h e standard of proof in all
proceedings under these rules, whether initiated by a notice of agency action or request
for agency action, shall be a preponderance of the evidence." Utah Administrative
Code Rule R151-46b-10(8) (October 1, 1996)(Effective March 4, 1996). (Emphasis
added.) This rule was adopted by the Department "under the authority of Subsection
63-46b-1(6) and Section 13-1-6 to define, clarify, or establish the procedures which

13

Scarpa argues in Point I of his brief that his procedure of making double copies
of appraisals with differing signatures was simply an attempt to document his
participation in appraisals while still satisfying lenders who would supposedly allow only
the certified appraiser to sign an appraisal. He claims that at the time, the Uniform
Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice ("USPAP"), had some potentially
inconsistent requirements, and that he is being sanctioned over nothing more than an
honest disagreement over how to document his experience while still complying with
USPAP. (Since 1990, licensed appraisers have been required by Utah law to comply
with USPAP. Utah Code Ann. § 61-2b-27 (Supp. 1990)) His argument lacks credibility
because he admittedly used this procedure for lenders who imposed no such
restriction, and because by causing the deletion of the name of the registered appraiser
who performed the appraisal from his own copy, Scarpa went beyond the advice of his
own consultant, Joe Dunlop. Most importantly, his argument fails because it is based
on a false premise-that he provided significant professional assistance in the Larsen
and Warburton appraisals. As the Board concluded, this case is not about whether
Scarpa knew how to document his experience. It is about whether he earned the
experience in the first place. The Board concluded he did not.
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govern adjudicative proceedings before the department." Utah Administrative Code
Rule R151-46b-3 (October 1, 1996)(Effective March 4, 1996).
Utah law recognizes that "courts should uphold agency rules if they are
reasonable and rational." Union Pacific R. v. Auditing Div.. 842 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah
1992). A properly adopted rule has the effect of law. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a2(16)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1996). It is presumed valid. See Horton v. Utah State Retirement
Board. 842 P. 2d 928, 932, n. 2 (Utah App. 1992), and the cases cited therein.
While conceding that no statutory provision calls for a higher standard of proof
than that provided in the rule, Scarpa asserts that the Board erred in applying the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof in this case. He claims that the
Board should have required the Division to prove its case by "clear and convincing
evidence." Scarpa, in effect, is asking this Court to overturn Commerce Department
RuleR151-46b-10(8).
Rule 24(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure imposes the following burden on
the parties as they brief issues on appeal: "The argument shall contain the contentions
and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented . . . with citations to
the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." A party who fails to meet
this burden risks having the appellate court disregard issues which have not been
sufficiently briefed. This court has routinely declined to consider arguments which are
not adequately briefed on appeal." State v. Yates. 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App.
1992).
The Board respectfully submits that Scarpa has failed to adequately brief his
-32-

challenge to its application of the preponderance of the evidence standard required by
the rule. He has failed to meet his burden of challenging the constitutionality and
validity of the rule. He cites no controlling case authority. His only Utah case reference
in purported support of his claim is to dictum in the case of Harken Southwest
Corporation v. Board of Oil. Gas and Mining. 920 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1996). He makes
reference to statutes which are not relevant and do not support the generalized
assertions for which he cites them (for example, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (1993),
which is part of the criminal code, and Utah Code Ann. §§ 68-3-11 and 68-3-12 (1993),
which are part of the general rules of statutory construction). He offers no constitutional
analysis.
Scarpa has failed to adequately brief the burden of proof issue. The Court
should decline to consider his challenge to the application of the Department's rule.

POINT III
EVEN IF THE BOARD ERRED IN APPLYING THE PREPONDERANCE
OF THE EVIDENCE STANDARD, THE ERROR WAS HARMLESS
BECAUSE THE BOARD DETERMINED THAT THE PROOF OF
SCARPA'S FRAUDULENT CONDUCT WAS SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY
A CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE STANDARD
Although the Board concluded that the standard of proof which governed this
proceeding is a preponderance of the evidence, it also concluded "that the quantum of
evidence in this proceeding is sufficient to satisfy a 'clear and convincing' evidentiary
standard." (R. 301). Accordingly, even if the Board erred in applying the
preponderance of the evidence standard, the error was harmless because the Board
-33-

determined that it would have reached the same decision under either standard. Thus,
Scarpa could not demonstrate substantial prejudice. Morton Intern.. Inc. v. Auditing
Piv.. 814 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 1991).

POINT IV
SCARPA WAIVED ANY ARGUMENT THAT THE DIVISION DID NOT
COMPLY WITH DISCOVERY REQUIREMENTS
In Point V of his argument, Scarpa argues that the Division somehow violated
discovery requirements by not providing him a copy of Larsen's working papers when it
received them several weeks before the hearing.14 Scarpa failed to properly preserve
this issue and has waived this argument on appeal.
When Larsen testified at the hearing that she had given her working papers to
the Division several weeks earlier, Scarpa was put on notice that this had happened. If

14

Although Scarpa waived the discovery issue on appeal by not raising it at the
hearing, it is important to note that in his brief, Scarpa misrepresents the content of the
record. He states on page 42 that 'The Division filed an Amended Witness and Exhibit
List dated May 24, 1997, representing that it was in the process of obtaining Ms.
Larsen's file with the appraisal reports on the five subject appraisals, including all the
work papers and field notes. (R.00266)." (Emphasis added.) This cite is to the reply
memorandum Scarpa filed in support of his request for reconsideration, not to the
Division's witness and exhibit list. The Division's Amended Witness and Exhibit List
actually reads as follows: 'The Division is in the process of obtaining from Teresa
Larsen copies of her file copies of the appraisal reports on the following properties [the
addresses of the five Larsen appraisals are here set forth]." (R. 110). There is no
mention of work papers and field notes, just the appraisal reports themselves. Scarpa's
misquotation from the record gives the false impression that the Division was in the
process at that time of obtaining copies of Larsen's working papers for use as a
possible exhibit, but such was not the case. Furthermore, the working papers were
never received as an exhibit and are not part of the record on review.
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he had felt the Division had violated any discovery requirements by not providing him a
copy of those papers, he needed to make a specific objection at that time. That would
have given the Board an opportunity to deal with his objection at the hearing, while the
Board, the parties, their counsel, and Teresa Larsen were present. If Scarpa had felt
he had somehow been unfairly surprised and that he needed time to review the working
papers, it was his burden to make a specific objection at that time and request
appropriate relief, such as a recess, or even a continuance of the hearing, to give him
an opportunity to review the papers, to cross examine Larsen about them and to
present testimony of his own. He could have even asked the Board to keep the record
open for a period of time and to permit him to present supplemental evidence. He did
none of these things. At no time during the hearing did Scarpa raise the issue that the
Division had violated discovery requirements by not providing him with those papers.
Accordingly, he waived the right to have that issue considered on judicial review. As
this Court held in Barney v. Utah Dept. of Commerce.
Counsel did not timely object to the specific defects Barney now raises on
appeal. Moreover, counsel failed to make a motion for relief, denying the
administrative law judge any opportunity to remedy the defects.
Therefore, we are unable to consider Barney's due process claims.
Barnev. 885 P.2d at 809. Further, in Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman. this Court held that
"It is axiomatic in our adversary system that a party must raise an objection in an earlier
proceeding or waive its right to litigate the issue in subsequent proceedings." 790 P.2d
587, 589 (Utah App. 1990).
When Scarpa submitted his request for reconsideration to the Board, he made a
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belated attempt to raise the issue of the alleged violation of discovery requirements. It
was within the sound discretion of the Board to decide whether to allow him to raise this
issue on reconsideration,15 and it chose not to address that issue in its order on
reconsideration.
Since Scarpa failed to preserve the discovery issue, he has waived that
argument on review and this Court should disregard it.16

POINT V
SCARPA WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE FACT THAT THE DIVISION
DID NOT PROVIDE HIM WITH TERESA LARSEN'S WORKING
PAPERS
Even if Scarpa had preserved the issue below, he was not prejudiced by the fact
that the Division did not provide him with Larsen's working papers before the hearing.
In its order on reconsideration the Board, without discussing the merits of Scarpa's
claim that the Division violated discovery rules, considered whether Scarpa had in any
event been prejudiced by the fact that the Division did not provide him with Larsen's
working files. It concluded as follows:

15

Since it is within the discretion of an administrative agency to grant or deny a
request for reconsideration in the first place, it is certainly within its discretion to decide
whether to reconsider one of several issues a party attempts to raise on
reconsideration. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(3) (1993)
,6

Even though Scarpa's waiver of this issue makes it unnecessary to discuss the
merits of his argument, it is important to note that on page 3 of his brief, where he
addresses the standard of review he believes applies, he cites the case of Semeco
Industries v. State Tax Com'n. 849 P.2d 1167, 1172 (Utah 1993) without indicating that
page 1172 of this case is part of the dissenting opinion.
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Nevertheless, Respondent had an opportunity to inquire of Ms. Larsen as
to the availability of those materials prior to the hearing and, if necessary,
obtain a subpoena to compel production of those documents. More
significantly, Ms. Larsen had the field notes and original work papers in
her possession during the hearing in question and she reviewed those
documents to respond to a question from Mr. Ferguson. Respondentthrough his counsel-thus had the opportunity to review those materials at
that time, cross examine Ms. Larsen in that regard and also elicit
testimony from Respondent as might have possibly been aided by his
review of those documents.
The Board thus concludes that no proper basis exists to now provide the
field notes and original work papers to Respondent with a view toward any
further supplemental proceedings in this case. Since Respondent's own
admissions form the lynchpin on which the October 29, 1996 Order is
based, the Board concludes that Respondent has not established he was
prejudiced in any ability to present testimony in this case by reason of the
fact that Ms. Larsen's field notes and original work papers were not
available prior to the hearing.
(R. 300).
The Board was obviously convinced that since Scarpa had ample opportunity to
obtain access to Larsen's working papers from November 1994 up through and
including time of the hearing itself, and since it found that in any event his own
admissions formed the crux of its findings against him, Scarpa was not prejudiced by
the fact that the Division did not provide him with a copy of those papers after it
received them some weeks before the hearing.
For the same reasons, this Court should also conclude that Scarpa was not
substantially prejudiced by the fact that the Division did not give him a copy of Larsen's
working papers, and is thus not entitled to relief in this judicial review proceeding. Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1993).
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CONCLUSION
Scarpa has failed to meet his burden on appeal. He is not entitled to any relief.
The Board respectfully asks the Court to affirm its order on reconsideration.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of November, 1997.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

BLAINE R. FERGUSON
U
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this 3rd day of November, 1997,1 mailed two copies of the
foregoing Brief of Respondent to each of the following persons at the following
addresses by first-class mail, postage prepaid:
E. H. Fankhauser
Attorney for Ronald Scarpa
243 E 400 S, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Candice Ragsdale-Pollock
Attorney for Ronald Scarpa
254 W 400 S, Suite 320
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

BLAINE R. FERGUSON
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time under review. Appraisal Professionals employed various state-registered appraisers between
June 1992 and September 1994.
2.

Respondent submitted a November 9, 1994 application to the Division, seeking

approval to take the examination for licensure as a state-certified residential appraiser.
Respondent submitted an appraiser certification documentation form, which listed the various
appraisals he purportedly conducted to satisfy the two-year experience requirement as a
prerequisite to any certification as a state-certified residential appraiser. When Respondent
submitted that form, he thus attested the information on the form was true. Respondent further
attested that he understood he could be required to substantiate the claimed experience in question
by submitting written reports or file memoranda and that willfully submitting false information
could result in license revocation and/or criminal prosecution.
3.

Teresa Larsen was employed by Appraisal Professionals as a state-registered appraiser

during November and December 1992. Based on the substantial and more credible evidence
presented, Ms. Larsen conducted five appraisals between November 5, 1992 and December 1,
1992 on properties at 1995 East Rua Branco Circle in Sandy, Utah; a Chase Lane condominium
at 462 West 1250 North in Centerville, Utah; a home under construction at 2275 West 10546
South in South Jordan, Utah; a residence at 876 South 2200 East in Salt Lake City, Utah; and a
residence at 2086 E. Kramer Drive in Sandy, Utah. Mr. Higgs accompanied Ms. Larsen in her
on-site inspection of those five properties and he conducted a review of her appraisal on each
property.
4.

Respondent listed each of the just-referenced five appraisals on the experience

documentation form which he submitted to the Division to obtain credit for possible certification
as a state-certified residential appraiser. Based on the substantial and more credible evidence
presented, Respondent did not personally inspect any of the properties in question incident to the
appraisal of those properties by Ms. Larsen. Respondent provided some guidance to Ms. Larsen
as to the appraisal procedure on one of the properties. He inserted some language on the
appraisal report for one of the properties. Respondent also provided building plans to Ms. Larsen
on one of the properties and he rephrased comments initially prepared by Ms. Larsen as to one of
the appraisal reports in question.

2
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The appraisal reports on the above-referenced five properties which were appraised by
Ms. Larsen were submitted to lenders and those reports accurately reflect Ms. Larsen as the
appraiser who conducted those appraisals However, Respondent instrni foil Ms. Larsen tu prepare
an additional copy of each appraisal which she had conducted. He also instructed Ms. Larsen lo
delete her name and signature on those appraisals and then generate a document on each appraisal
to reflect his name and signature as the appraiser who conducted those appraisals

Respondent

required those additional documents be prepared and he signed them to subsequently claim credit
for having performed thu i apprais*il
6

Bruce I

!

<on was employed 1 A| | laisal Fiofessionals as i "-il ill -legisltrieJ
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Warburton to prepare those reports to reflect Respondent had joined Mr. Warburton and Mr.
Higgs in conducting those appraisals.
9.

Based on the substantial and more credible evidence presented, Respondent frequently

provided training and clerical assistance to Ms. Larsen, Mr. Warburton and the other stateregistered appraisers in the office. He also periodically supervised the work performed by those
appraisers. However, Respondent did not provide significant professional assistance on any of the
above-described five appraisals conducted by Ms. Larsen as to thus claim credit toward the
experience required to possibly qualify for certification as a state-certified residential appraiser.
Respondent also did not provide significant professional assistance in any of the three appraisals
conducted by Mr. Warburton and Mr. Higgs as to thus claim credit toward the experience
required to possibly qualify for certification as a state-certified residential appraiser.
10.

During the time under review, Respondent instructed both Ms. Larsen, Mr.

Warburton and other state-registered appraisers in the office to prepare an additional copy of all
appraisals which they had conducted. Respondent instructed each state-registered appraiser to
then generate a document by routinely deleting the appraiser's name and signature on the copy of
an appraisal report and then inserting his name and signature as the appraiser who conducted that
appraisal. Based on the substantial and more credible evidence presented, Respondent frequently
engaged in that practice to thus document his appraisal experience for purposes of his subsequent
application for certification as a state-certified residential appraiser. Given the just-described
office procedure, there is a lack of substantial and credible evidence Respondent conducted any
other appraisal listed on the experience documentation form or otherwise provided significant
professional assistance on each appraisal as to properly claim credit for certification as a statecertified residential appraiser.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Utah Code Ann. §61-2b-16(1) provides an original certification may only be issued to a
person "who is of good moral character". §61-2b-16(2) specifically provides:
The board shall require and pass upon proof necessary to determine the honesty,
competency, integrity, and truthfulness of each applicant.
Based on a preponderance of the evidence, the Board finds and concludes Respondent has
claimed experience credit for appraisals which were actually performed by other appraisers and
4
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Respondent provided no significant professional assistance in the performance of those appraisals
as to qualify foi JIIIM) expenence credit. The Board further finds and concludes Respondent
.;. ed file copies of certain appraisals to reflect his participation a5 tht appiajsei wlitiea* iho«r
appraisals were actually performed by other state-registn i 1 ii| | i.ilsers employed by Respondent
I I ni ni ugh Appraisal Professionals,
U1! Hi. n Respondent submitted the documentation form as a predicate to possible certificate in
as a state-certified residential appraiser, he attested under penalty of perjury and potential license
revocation thnt tfn appraisal experience claimed on tht documentation form was; accural!

Hi 1

on a prep in I ranee of the evidence, the Board finds and concludes Respondent devised i
III in I ni ml ni ni il scheme in an attempt to obtain licensure as a state-certified residential appraise!

I he

I In,ii < I 11 nii finds and concludes Respondent has not established his honesty, integrity and
Li ulJ il I ni I in

IIII J

he thus lacks the necessary qualifications for such licensure.

§61 -2b-29 further provides certain acts and omissions constitute unprofessional conduct
uluth shall be considered ground^ for disciplinary actinium i

il

(1) procuring or attempting to procure registration or certification under this
:T by fraud or by making a false statement, submitting false information, makinp
"'al misrepresentation in an application filed with the division
The Board finds and concludes Respondent submitted false infoi mad m In the Division on
his application for certification as a state-certified residential appraiM i

| i i Really, Respondent

improperly sought credit for experience on at least eight appraisals when he had not provided
significant professional assistance in the performance of those appraisals. Moreover, Respondent
engaged in a course of fraudulently devious conduct when he created false copies of appraisals
II M I >rmed by state-registered appraisers in his employ to subsequent!) claim credit tor expem in

k

on those appraisals in his application for certification as a state-certified residential appraisn
The Board thus finds and concludes a proper factual and legal basis exists to enter a discipline j
sanction as to Respondent's license.
f'he MM ml liiiil A\ 1 MM .vledges Respondent's testimony that certain lending institutions
would not accept an appraisal report signed by two appraisrT if the appraisal was—in factconducted by more than one appraise? Nevertheless, the Luaid necessarily disregards
Respondent's rather self-serving assert iun I hat such lending nrilitirtions ever required, requested or

5
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suggested that an appraisal report be submitted which did not accurately reflect when more than
one appraiser had conducted that appraisal.
Significantly, the appraisal report form submitted to lenders on those properties appraised
by Ms. Larsen provides for the entry of the name(s) of each appraiser who may have conducted
any given appraisal. If Respondent had actually joined Ms. Larsen or any other state-registered
appraiser employed by Appraisal Professionals in conducting one of the appraisals in question, the
appraisal report submitted to any given lending institution was necessarily inaccurate if it did not
reflect the fact of Respondent's significant professional assistance. Moreover, copies of appraisal
reports which Respondent submitted to the Division to thus document his claim for experience
toward certification as a state-certified residential appraiser were also inaccurate because he did
not acknowledge the significant professional assistance provided by Ms. Larsen or any other
appraiser in each instance.
Simply put, Respondent prompted the submission of appraisal reports to a lender which do
not reflect that he provided any significant professional assistance in conducting those appraisals,
yet Respondent now claims that he was so involved for purposes of obtaining credit toward
certification as a state-certified residential appraiser. The gist of Respondent's testimony is that
appraisals were submitted to certain lending institutions in violation of the uniform standards of
professional appraisal practice when those appraisal reports did not accurately reflect all
appraisers who provided significant professional assistance in conducting those appraisals.
Respondent created false copies of appraisals and then submitted that information to the Division.
The information thus submitted also fails to accurately reflect the appraisers who provided
significant professional assistance on those appraisals. Essentially, Respondent engaged in
unprofessional conduct in the practice of real estate appraising which constitutes dishonesty and
fraud. See §61-2b-29(3).
The Board necessarily concludes Respondent's entirely unwarranted and devious course of
misconduct reveals that he lacks the qualifications for certification as a state-certified residential
appraiser and also establishes a pattern of dishonest andfraudulentmisconduct in the practice of
real estate appraising. Given the serious and repeated nature of Respondent's misconduct, the
Board necessarily concludes the Order set forth below is warranted to adequately protect the
public.
6
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ORDER
WHFREFOKL II i ORDERED that Respondrnt^ i| plication for licensure as a sUiccertified residential appraiser shall be denied
It is further ordered that Respondent's license as a state-registered it J estate appraisei ski
be revoked. Said revocation shall be effective thirty (30) days from the date of this Order.
Dated this ^ 7 ^ d a y of October, 1996.

M. Lindl^v

Dorothy M/ Burnham

Jerry RQ Webber
Agency reconsideration of this Order may be obtained by filing a request for such review
* 1 (he Board within twenty (20) days after the issuance of this Order. Any such request miLl
comply with the requirements of Utah Code Ann §63-46b-13 and Rl51-46b-13.

017?

Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on the ^ / ~riay of October, 1996, a copy of the foregoing
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order was sent, by regular mail, postage prepaid,
to Blaine R. Ferguson, Assistant Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, P. O. Box 140872,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0872 and E. H. Fankhauser, Attorney for Respondent, 243 East
400 South, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, UT 84111. A copy of the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order was also hand delivered to Shelley K. Wismer, Staff Legal
Counsel, Division of Real Estate.

Diane M.
Administrative Assistant
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Case No, AP94-11-18

1

I

I fc an October 29, 1996 Order, Respon I m's application foi licensure as a

slafi certified residential appraiser was denied

kitHI OU I I*« *pondent's license as a state-

j

rttM' lured real estate appraiser was revoked. The revnn i m was to become effective thirty
(10» days from the date of the October 29, 1996 Order.
Respondent filed a November IS 1996 request for agency reconsideration of the
Ortober 29, 1996 Onln

Ihr Di\ision filed a Dn mibn R 1996 response and a final iqih

was filed January 8» 194 ?.
111

•

l li

ard reviewed the just-stated submissions and determined no oral argument

would be necessary or beneficial to address the issues raised in Respondent's request for
agency reconsideration

,rdingly, the Court conducted a January 16, 1997 telephone

conference with Biam F

,;uson, counsel for the Division of Occupational and Professional

Licensing, and E. EL Fankhauser, counsel for Respondent

i he Court thus informed

re pective counsel no oral argument would be presented and the Board would conduct
iltliberations as tt OR pending request for agency reconsideration on January 21, 1997.
However, one of the four Board members who are participating in this case was not
available on the just-stated ilitr

1 k Louil thus contacted respective counsel on January 22,

pmj and informed counsel that the Board would meet in hh Januai> I1***r If iddiess the
I muling request

Hit Court subsequently informed respective counsel that Board deliberations

nntild be conducted on January 30, 1997 and a decision on Respondent's request for agencv
reconsideration w uM issue within twenty (20) days thereaflu
Tht Hoard, In UIJL lull)

I

.1

ill jiipmi^ now enters the following Supplemental
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and Modified Findings of Fact, Accompanying Conclusions of Law and Order. The Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law—initially set forth in the October 29, 1997 Order-are
otherwise reaffirmed and incorporated herein by reference.
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Respondent's own testimony clearly and convincingly establishes that he knowingly
submitted false appraisal reports to lending institutions. Specifically, those reports did not
reflect all appraisers who had purportedly conducted those appraisals.
2. Respondent's own testimony clearly and convincingly establishes he submitted
altered copies of five appraisal reports to the Division as to obtain credit toward possible
certification as a certified real estate appraiser. Specifically, those copies did not accurately
reflect that the appraisals had been performed by Ms. Larsen. Moreover, those appraisal
reports contain a certification that Respondent had conducted an interior and exterior
inspection of the subject property when—in fact—he never performed such an inspection.
Respondent thus knowingly and intentionally misrepresented that he had conducted a complete
inspection of the five subject properties.
3. Respondent did not conduct a complete personal inspection of the three buildings
which were the subject of the appraisals performed by Mr. Warburton and Mr. Higgs.
Moreover, the valuation Respondent prepared for one of those properties was not used to
prepare the appraisal report for that property. Rather, Respondent made that valuation after
Mr. Warburton had appraised the property and did so solely for comparative purposes to
enable Mr. Higgs to review the appraisal which had been completed by Mr. Warburton.
4. There is no substantial evidence Respondent provided significant professional
assistance to either Ms. Larsen or Mr. Warburton as to appraisals performed on the eight
properties in question. Respondent periodically provided guidance on appraisal procedures to
other appraisers employed by Appraisal Professionals. He also periodically provided clerical
assistance and background information on properties or made grammatical changes on
appraisal reports. However, the just-described work does not constitute significant
professional assistance as to claim credit for having performed any of the eight appraisals in
question.
MODIFIED FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Based on the Board's recollection of the evidence presented during the September
2
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9 111 1996 hearing and a review of the arguments submitted by respective counsel on
Respondent's request for agency reconsideration, the Board finds and concludes there is no
substantial evidence to sustain the iuiding-iiutidll> eiUuui I illit Buanlll in Paragraph IJ uf
the October 29, 1996 Order-that Respondent failed to condiu I an> othei appraisal listed on
the experience documentation form which was submitted to the Division The Board similar!)
I I > and concludes there is no substantial evidence to sustain the related finding that
I indent otherwise failed to provide significant professional assistance on the remaining
appraisals as in piopeil) t him credit for certification as a stdl<'-certified residential appraisu.
" The Board erred when it made the just-described misuppt 11< <1 finding
Specifically the Board improperly speculated whether Respondent should receive uedil I i
nili< i appraisals beyond the eight appraisals directly in question relative to this proceeding
Accordingly, the Board's findings regarding any other appraisals are hereby vacated. Siiri] hm
pul any issue as to credit for other appraisals was not properly before the Board in this
proceeding.
t i l ill »i«ri I i'l 11 if !""' i'i il il

' '" '

PPqiondent contends specific grounds exist to warrai I Ifn reversal ot the October 29%
1

Order. Respondent thus asserts a new hearing should be granted on numerous matei M!
Specifically, he urges: (1) there is no sufficient and credible evidence he did not

substantially participate in the eight appraisals under review, (2) no statute or rule establishes
n "significant professional assistance test" and, hence, the Board impiuperl) applied that
hn1 in this proceeding and (3) the Division failed to disclose to Respondent thai Hr

I

Larsen had the field notes and original work papers as to the five appraisals in question and
ondent was thus prejudiced in his ability to establish the nature of his participation on
llius

i

1

Respondent furthei asserts 11

o statute or rule prescribes the method whereby an

i| | mi iir^j in tr document participation uu an appraisal an'1 «J-«">< ir< luidantt, Respondent
has properly documented the work he fperformed as to re^,. .redit toward possible
lication as a residential appraiser; I I I lie Board applied an erroneous standard of proof to
1

I he had engaged in fraudulent misconduct, the proper standard being that of clear and

convincing evidence (!) the Eloard has abused its discretion and—without any sufficient
evidence—has speculated d 1 i VIIK tin i Ki M
| mli I I performi il other appraisal* llHf I i the

3

0297

experience documentation form, thus giving rise to the appearance of bias against Respondent;
and (4) Respondent was improperly limited in his ability to call witnesses sufficient to refute
the credibility of adverse witnesses and he was thus denied due process.
Two procedural issues should be initially addressed. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b13(l)(a) provides any party may file a written request for reconsideration with the agency and
is thus required to state "the specific grounds upon which relief is requested". The Division
correctly asserts no Utah statute or rule sets forth the grounds which must be invoked as to
prompt agency reconsideration. However, Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
sets forth those grounds which may justify granting a new trial, taking additional testimony,
amending findings of fact and conclusions of law, making new findings or conclusions and
directing the entry of a new judgment. The Board duly acknowledges R151-46b-5(3), which
provides:
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and case law thereunder may be
looked to as persuasive authority upon these rules, but shall not, except as
otherwise provided by Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, or
by these rules, be considered controlling authority.
The Division accurately asserts that the "specific grounds"—alluded to in §63-46b13(l)(a)--should be those expressly set forth in Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Respondent has invoked various provisions of that rule in his request for agency
reconsideration. Accordingly, the Board readily acknowledges Respondent has adequately
identified the grounds upon which relief is now requested.
The Division asserts Respondent has not provided a transcript of the September 9-10,
1996 hearing. The Division thus contends the Board should necessarily disregard any
challenges to findings based on an alleged insufficiency of evidence to support those findings.
Rl 51-46b-13 sets forth the rules which govern agency reconsideration. Significantly, those
rules do not require that the record of the hearing be submitted with any citations to that
record regarding any challenged findings of fact. Rl 51-46b-12, which governs agency
review, expressly requires the preparation and submission of a transcript if the grounds for
agency review include any challenge to a determination of fact or conclusion of law as
unsupported by or contrary to the evidence. See R151-46b-12(3)(c) and (d).
Since Rl 51-46b-13 does not require a transcript be filed, the Board necessarily rejects
the Division's contention that Respondent's challenge to any finding based on an alleged
4
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fTLiency of the evidence should be either ignored or summarily rejected smipl) because
I'. "pondent has not provided a transcript of the hearing. Accordingly, I Iff1 H nr I In
^ssed the issues thus raised by Respondent based on the Board's J

ion of the

testinioii) presented during the September 9-10, 1996 hearing Conceded!), Respondent's
assertions and the Board's review of those issues would hau been necessarily aidtd b> tin
>ion of a transcript

Beyond the modified fundings ot fact set forth above, the Board

ludes Respondent has failed to sustain his burden of establishing the evidence is not
*uiiicient to support any other findings entered by the Boai i I
Mi iiu illistanding Respondent's belabored arguments as to whether he substantially
pailiupated in tb eight appraisals fi i whit 1 IM litis souglil n dil, the crux of this case lies in
Respondent's own testimony that he submitted appraisal reports to lending institutions which
I I not reflect his purported participation as an appraiser with respect to those properties and
he submitted altered copies of appraisal reports to the Division In < I lain credit toward state
nTlification as a residential appraiser when those reports did not reflect that Ms. Larsen or
Mi i dil in ton had perfoiioed those respective appraisals Beyond the substantial and
credible testimony offered by an> nlhw witness, Respondenl s uv\n admissions clearly
11i h that he submitted false statements to both lending institutions and the Division lor
m

mg purposes.
1 he Board reiterates there is ample evidence I 11 iid and conclude Respondent did not

substantially participate in the five Larsen appraisals or the three Warburton appraisals. The
Board acknowledges no M-iftid MI IIIII establishes a "significant professional assistance test" as
to govern when an appraiser can properly obtain credit on work allegedly performed during
the course of an appraisal Nevertheless, USPAP Standard Rule 2-3 specifically requires that
all significant professional assistance be acknowledged on an appraisal repnil It is undisputed
I Respondent failed ii

inply with that standard when he submitted the appraisal reporl

HI question to certain lending institutions and then submitted altered file copies of those same
reports to the Division m to obtain credit I
1

"

\\ . iihli certification UL» j residential appraiser.

u

r>ard notes Respondent's testimony that he meiel) complied with purported

i". -.-* v- Horn various lending institutions and that he acted on the advice of Mr, Dunlop as
U.
pivn .ifi|ir ii i

i subsequently document whatever he may have done during the course ol a
i

rthcless, USPAP Standard Rule 2-3 governs every appraisal repoit
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submitted to a lending institution. Moreover, the Board concludes there is no justification to
excuse the fact that Respondent fraudulently submitted altered copies of appraisal reports to
the Division which did not reflect that another appraiser had performed those appraisals.
Significant professional assistance, while not defined by statute or rule, is a well
recognized and commonly understood standard in the appraisal industry. Simply put,
significant professional assistance is commonly accepted to mean that an appraiser has
provided input into the final value estimate of the property in question. The Board reiterates
that instructing a fellow appraiser as to appraisal procedures, providing clerical assistance or
background information and making grammatical corrections in appraisal reports does not
constitute significant professional assistance within the meaning of the above-described
standard. Clearly, members of the appraisal profession can be properly held to understand the
various standards of performance which govern all appraisals. Moreover, such standards of
performance can be properly applied and interpreted by members of this Board in the process
of administrative adjudication. See Vance v. Fordham, 671 P.2d 124, 129 (Utah 1983).
The Board acknowledges the Division did not provide Ms. Larsen9 s field notes and
original work papers to Respondent prior to the hearing as to the five appraisals in question.
Nevertheless, Respondent had an opportunity to inquire of Ms. Larsen as to the availability of
those materials prior to the hearing and, if necessary, obtain a subpoena to compel production
of those documents. More significantly, Ms. Larsen had the field notes and original work
papers in her possession during the hearing in question and she reviewed those documents to
respond to a question from Mr. Ferguson. Respondent-through his counsel-thus had the
opportunity to review those materials at that time, cross examine Ms. Larsen in that regard
and also elicit testimony from Respondent as might have possibly been aided by his review of
those documents.
The Board thus concludes no proper basis exists to now provide the field notes and
original work papers to Respondent with a view toward any further supplemental proceedings
in this case. Since Respondent's own admissions form the lynchpin on which the October 29,
1996 Order is based, the Board concludes that Respondent has not established he was
prejudiced in any ability to present testimony in this case by reason of the fact that Ms.
Larsen9 s field notes and original work papers were not available prior to the hearing.
Respondent accurately asserts no statute or rule prescribes the method by which an
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iippiaiser is to document participation in an appraisal as to potentially receive credit toward
p, u.iihle certification, However, Respondent clearly misrepresented the manner in which the
eight appraisals had been 11 riormed when he failed to provide documentation to the Division
which reflected the fact that both Ms Larsen and rvii }\ arbmrtnii ki 1 participated in the
appiaisals in question. The Board reiterates the following conclusions of law, previously set
forth in its October 29, 1996 Order:
Significantly, the appraisal report form submitted to lenders on those
properties appraised by Ms. Larsen provides for the entry of the name(s) of
each appraiser who may have conducted any given appraisal. If Respondent
had actually joined Ms. Larsen or any other state-registered appraiser
employed by Appraisal Professionals in conducting one of the appraisals in
question, the appraisal report submitted to any given lending institution was
necessarily inaccurate if it did not reflect the fact of Respondent's significant
professional assistance. Moreover, copies of appraisal reports which
Respondent submitted to the Division to thus document his claim for
experience toward certification as a state-certified residential appraiser were
also inaccurate because he did not acknowledge the significant professional
assistance provided by Ms. Larsen or any other appraiser in each instance.
(All emphasis herein added).
The issue is not whether Respondent knew how to document his experience. Rather,
Respondent elected to do so by fraudulent means with the intended purposes of insuring that
d]j|)iaisals would be approved by lending institutions and he would also subsequently receive
credit ior those appraisals ds to obtain certification as a residential appraiser.
Hit Board reiterates that the undisputed testknoii) • iiuiiicall) uJlered b) Respondent
himself—provides clear and convincing evidence that he devised a fraudulent scheme in an
aflempt to obtain licensure as a state-certified residential appraiser. Moreover, there is also
I ni and convincing evidence Respondent engaged in a course of fraudulently devious
in I met when he created false copies of appraisals performed by state-registered appraisers in
his emplin lb > >ubsequenll i Mm credit for experience on those appraisals in his application
for certification as a state-certified residential appraisei.
Notwithstanding this Board's conclusion tktl tin i|ii nil in no ol utidcik L iiii iliiiis
I ni ceding is sufficient to satisfy a "clear and coin inn nit" i ni lentiary standard, the Board
(in mini (11 er concludes that the standard of proof whicli g^ i \ i, 111 f 111 proceeding in all respects is a
preponderance of the evidrtrr

R151-46b-10 governs all hearings held in departmental

adpidicative proceedings P h i 4hb 10(K) ,,., •, ,
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The standard of proof in all proceedings under these rules, whether
initiated by a notice of agency action or a request for agency action, shall be a
preponderance of the evidence.
The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged that the standard of proof generally
applicable to proceedings before administrative agencies is one of a "preponderance of the
evidence". Harken Southwest Corporation v. Board of Oil Gas and Mining, 920 P.2d 1176,
1182 (Utah 1996). The Harken Court thus concluded that the correct standard of proof (i.e.,
preponderance of the evidence) had been properly applied in that case. Concededly, the
Harken decision includes the following passage:
Absent an allegation of fraud or a statute or a court rule requiring the
higher standard, the standard of proof in administrative proceedings is a
preponderance of the evidence. In re D'Angelo, 105 N.M. 391, 393, 733 P.2d
360, 362 (1986).
Significantly, the just-quoted language is dictum, given the Court's analysis of the applicable
quantum of evidence and the nature of the allegations in the Harken case.
Accordingly, this Board concludes the Harken decision does not establish that the
standard of proof for allegations of fraud in an administrative adjudicatory proceeding is clear
and convincing evidence. This Board acknowledges the just-stated standard generally applies
when fraud claims are asserted in a civil action. See Utah State Department of Social
Services v. Pierren, 619 P.2d 1380, 1381-82 (Utah 1980); Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Myers,
871 P.2d 1041, 1046-47 (Utah App. 1994). However, the Board further notes the usual
standard of proof in both attorney and judicial discipline proceedings is a preponderance of
the evidence. See In re Worthen, 302 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 11 (1996).
Respondent has provided no legal authority from the courts of this state to support his
assertion that allegations of fraud in an adjudicative proceeding conducted pursuant to the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. The
governing department rule has no such provision. Moreover, the courts of this state have not
engrafted any such requirement on the standard of proof applicable in attorney or judicial
discipline proceedings. Absent unequivocal direction from the courts of this state, this Board
necessarily concludes any allegations of fraudulent misconduct in this proceeding may be
properly established by a preponderance of the evidence.
The Board concurs with both the Division and Respondent that the Board erred when
it entered any findings as to other appraisals which were not within the scope of the
8
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allegations of this proceeding. Based on the modified Findings of Fact previously set forth
herein, the Board necessarily disregards Respondent's implicit assertion there is any evidence
the Board was biased or prejudiced against Respondent in this proceeding.
The Board further concludes that Respondent had a fair opportunity to present
evidence in this proceeding which was neither repetitive nor cumulative. Significantly,
Respondent presented testimony from eleven witnesses over the course of the two-day
hearing. The Board concludes Respondent was not improperly limited in his ability to both
present the relevant and material evidence in support of his various defenses in this
proceeding and also challenge the credibility of any adverse witness.
ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED no proper factual or legal basis exists to conduct a
new hearing or any further proceedings in this case. The Board has reconsidered its October
29, 1996 Order in light of the issues presented by Respondent. Beyond entry of the matters
set forth herein, the Board concludes no further relief is warranted. The October 29, 1996
Order shall thus become effective thirty (30) days from the date of this Order.
Dated this

day of February, 1996.

Judicial review of this Order may be obtained pursuant to §63-46b-14 and §63-46b-16,
consistent with the provisions of those statutes.
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By the Administrative Law Judge:
The Court conducted a February 20, 1997 telephonic conference with Blaine R. Ferguson,
counsel for the Division of Real Estate, and E. H. Fankhauser, counsel for Respondent. The
Court thus informed respective counsel that three Board members (Brad M. Lindley, Dorothy
M. Burnham, and Jerry R. Webber) signed the foregoing Order on February 20, 1997. The
Court further informed respective counsel that the remaining Board member participating in
this case (James W. Fauver) was initially expected to sign the Order on that date, but he
would not be available to do so for one week.
Accordingly, the Court and respective counsel agreed the Order would be issued-with
Mr. Fauver's signature—on February 27, 1997. Moreover, it was further agreed and the Court
so ordered that the time to file any petition for judicial review would not commence until
thirty (30) days from the issuance of the Order, as opposed to the February 20, 1997 date
initially entered on the Order.
Dated this

of February, 1997.

Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on the XT ^"day of February, 1997, a copy of the foregoing Order
on Request for Agency Reconsideration was sent, by regular mail, postage prepaid, to Blaine
R. Ferguson, Assistant Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, P. O. Box 140872, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114-0872 and E. H. Fankhauser, Attorney for Respondent, 243 East 400 South,
Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. A copy of the Order on Request for Agency
Reconsideration was also hand delivered to Shelley K. Wismer, Staff Legal Counsel, Division
of Real Estate.

Diane M. Kimfiierle
Administrative Assistant

10

0304

Addendum C

BEFORE THE REAL ESTATE APPRAISER
REGISTRATION AND CERTIFICATION BOARD
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the License of
Ronald J. Scarpa to Act as a
Registered Real Estate Appraiser
and to Become a Certified Real
Estate Appraiser

:
: NOTICE OF POSTHEARING CONFERENCE
: AND ENTRY OF NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER
:
Case No. AP94-11-18
:

By the Administrative Law Judge:
The Order on Respondent's Request for Agency Reconsideration in the above-entitled
proceeding was issued February 27, 1997. This Court issued a February 27, 1997 addendum to
that Order, which recites the time to file any petition for agency review would not commence
until thirty (30) days from the issuance of the Order.
The Division of Real Estate filed a March 7, 1997 motion, requesting entry of an order
to clarify that: (1) the October 29, 1996 Order initially entered by the Board would become
affective thirty (30) days after the issuance of the February 27, 1997 Order on Request for
Agency Reconsideration; and (2) any petition for judicial review must be filed within thirty (30)
days after February 27, 1997. The Court thus conducted a March 11, 1997 telephonic posthearing conference with Blaine R. Ferguson, counsel for the Division of Real Estate and E. H.
Fankhauser, counsel for Respondent.
There is a significant omission in this Court's February 27, 1997 addendum to the
Board's Order on Request for Agency Reconsideration. Further, that addendum contains a
clerical error. Specifically, the addendum should have included a provision that the October 29,
1996 Order would become effective thirty (30) days after the issuance of the February 27, 1997
Order on Request for Agency Reconsideration. Moreover, the addendum should have provided
that any petition for judicial review must be filed within the same time. Accordingly, the Court
informed respective counsel that the Court would enter a nunc pro tunc order to correct the
February 27, 1997 addendum and clarify the just-described issues.
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ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED the October 29, 1996 Order shall become effective on
March 31, 1997. Any petition for judicial review of that Order or the February 27, 1997 Order
on Request for Agency Reconsideration shall be filed no later than March 31, 1997.
The Order on Request for Agency Reconsideration also contains a clerical error.
Specifically, that Order recites its date as February 20, 1996. However, the correct date is
February 27, 1997 as reflected in this Court's February 27, 1997 addendum.
Dated this

/ g ^ * d a y of March, 1997.

Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on the f<^ ~ day of March, 1997, a copy of the foregoing Notice of
Posthearing Conference and Entry of Nunc Pro Tunc Order was sent, by regular mail, postage
prepaid, to Blaine R. Ferguson, Assistant Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, P. O. Box
140872, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0872 and E. H. Fankhauser, Attorney for Respondent, 243
East 400 South, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. A copy of the Notice of Posthearing
Conference and Entry of Nunc Pro Tunc Order was also hand delivered to Shelley K. Wismer,
Staff Legal Counsel, Division of Real Estate.

Diane M. Kimmerle
Administrative Assistant
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Addendum D

467

REAL ESTATE

dards Rule 6 of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice.
R162-104-13. Unacceptable Experience.
104.13. Unacceptable experience. An applicant will
not receive points toward satisfying the experience
requirement for registration or certification for performing the following:
(a) Appraisals of the value of a business as distinguished from the appraisal of commercial real estate;
or
(b) Personal property appraisals.
R162-104-14. Verification of Experience.
104.14. Verification of experience. The Board, at its
discretion, may verify the claimed experience by any
of the following methods: Verification with the clients; Submission of selected reports to the Board; and
Field inspection of reports identified by the applicant
at the applicant's office during normal business
hours.
R162-104-15. Experience Review Committee.
104.15. Experience Review Committee. There may
be a committee appointed by the Board to review the
experience claimed by applicants for certification.
104.15.1. The Committee shall:
104.15.1.1. Review all applications for adherence to
the experience required for certification;
304J5J..2, Correspond with applicants concerning
submissions, if necessary; and
104 15.1.3. Make recommendations to the Division
and the Board for certification approval or disapproval.
104.15.2. Committee composition. The Committee
shall be composed of appraisers from the following
categories: Residential appraisers; commercial appraisers; farm and ranch appraisers; right-of-way appraisers; and ad valorem appraisers.
104.15.2.1. The chairperson of the committee shall
be appointed by the Board.
104.15.2.2. Meetings may be called upon the request of the chairperson or upon the written request
of a quorum of committee members.
104.15.3. Reconsideration. If the review of an application has been performed by the Experience Review
Committee, and the Board has denied the application
based on insufficient experience, the applicant may
request that the Board reconsider the application by
making a written request within ten days after the
denial stating specific grounds upon which relief is
requested. The Board shall thereafter consider the
request and issue a written decision.
R162-104-16. Special Circumstances.
104.16. Special Circumstances. Applicants having
experience in categories other than those shown on
the Appraisal Experience Points Schedule, or applicants who believe the Experience Points Schedule
does not adequately reflect their experience, or applicants who believe the Experience Points Schedule
does not adequately reflect the complexity or time
spent on an appraisal, may petition the Board on an
individual basis for evaluation and approval of their
experience as being substantially equivalent to that
required for certification. Upon a finding that an applicant's experience is substantially equivalent to
that required for certification, the Board may waive
experience points, give an applicant credit for months
cf experience, or both.

R162-104-17

R162-104-17. Appraisal
Experience
Points
Schedule.
104.17. Appraisal Experience Points Schedule.
Points shall be awarded as follows:
104.17.1. Residential Experience Points Schedule.
The following points shall be awarded to form appraisals. Three points may be added to the points
shown if the appraisal was a narrative appraisal instead of a form appraisal.
TABLE 1
(a) One unit dwelling (including a ate)
(b) Two to four unit dwellings
(c) Employee Relocation Counsel reports
completed on currently accepted
Employee Relocation Counsel
form
(d) Residential lot, (1-4 family)
<e) Small parcel up to 5 acres
(f) Vacant land, 20-500 acres

1 point
4 point*

nuiTimiitn 50 points

4 points

(g) Recreational, farm, or timber acreage
suitable for a house site
up to 10 acres
Over 10 acres
(h) All other unusual structures or acreages,
which are much larger or more complex
than typical properties
d) Residential appraisal textbook authorship
not to exceed 20 points per year
(j) Residential appraisal articles in journals of
approved national appraisal organizations,
not to exceed 20 points per year
(k) Instructing an approved residential course
of 20 classroom hours or more

2 points
1 point
1 point

2 points
3 points
1-5 points
as determined
by the Board
As determined
by the Board
10 points
10 points

104.17.2. General Experience Points Schedule. All
appraisal reports claimed must be narrative appraisal reports.
TABLE 2
(a) Apartments, 5-100 units
over 100 units
(b) Hotel or motels, 50 units or less
51-150 units
Over 150 units
(c) Nursing home, rest home, care facilities,
Less than 80 beds
Over 80 beds
(d) Industrial or warehouse building,
Less than 20,000 square feet
Over 20,000 square feet, amgle tenant
Over 20,000 square feet, multiple tenants
(e) Office buildings
Leas than 10,000 square feet
Over 10,000 square feet, single tenant
Over 10,000 square feet, multiple tenants
(0 Condominiums, using income approach
to value
5 to 30 units
31 or more units
(g) Retail buildings
Less than 10,000 square feet
More than 10,000 square feet, single tenant
More than 10,000 square feet, multiple tenants
(h) Commercial or multiple family use acreage
which ts nonresidential
Less than 10 acres
100 acres or more
100 acres of more, income approach to value
(i) All other unusual structures or assignments
which are much larger or more complex than
the properties described in (a) to (h) herein.
(j) Instructing an approved general appraisal
course of 20 classroom hours or more, not to
exceed 20 points per year
(k) Textbook authorship in general appraisal
topics, not to exceed 20 point* per year
0) General field journal articles in journals of
approved national appraisal organizations,
not to exceed 20 points per year
(m) Subdivisions or Planned Unit Developments
1 to 25 units
Over 25 units
(n) Feasibility or market analysis

5 points
10 point*
6 points
8 points
10 points
8 points
10 points
6 points
8 points
10 points
6 points
8 points
10 points
6 points
10 points
€ points
8 points
10 points
4 points
6 point*
10 points
1 to 20
points as
determined
by Board
10 points
As determined
by Board
10 points
6 points
10 points
1 to 20

COMMERCE

R162-105-1
maximum 100 points

point* as
determined
by Board

Ad Valorem appraisals
(o) Development and implementation
of multiple regression model —
land valuation guide (up to
5000 parcels)
For each additional 5000 parcels,
add 1 point
(p) Depreciation study and analysis
(q) Sales ratio study and implementation
— physical inspection and review,
maximum 50 points
(r) Development of standards
of practice for
assessment administration and
writing of those
guidelines, maximum 40 points
(s) State assessed property —
gravel pits, mines, utilities
Farm and Ranch appraisals
(t) Irrigated cropland, pasture
other than rangeland,
1 to 10 acres
11-50 acres
51-200 acres
201-1000 acres
More than 1000 acres
(u) Dry farm, 1 to 1000 acres
More than 1000 acres
(v) Improvements on properties other than
a rural residence (maximum 2 points):
Dwelling
Sheds
(w) Cattle ranches
0-200 head
201-500 head
501-1000 head
More than 1000 head
(x) Sheep ranches
0-2000 head
More than 2000 head
(y) Dairies (includes all improvements
except a dwelling)
1-100 head
101-300 head
More than 300 head
(z) Orchards
5-50 acres
More than 50 acres
(aa) Rangeland/timber
0-640 acres
More than 640 acres
(bb) Poultry
0-100,000 birds
More than 100,000 birds
(cc) Mink
0-5000 cages
More than 5000 cages
(dd) Fish farms
(ee) Hog farms
(ff) Separate grazing privileges or permits

20 points
20 points
10 points
10-20
point* as
determined
by Board
1-20 points
as determined
by Board
Form
2
2.5
3
5
8
3
4

Narrative

pts. 3 pts.
pts. 4 pts.
pts. 5 pts.
pts. 8 pts.
pts. 10 pts.
pts. 5 pts.
pts. 8 pts.

lpt.
lpt.
0.5 pt. 0.5 pt.
3
5
6
8

pts. 4
pts. 6
pts. 8
pts. 10

pts.
pts.
pts.
pts.

5 pts.
7 pts.

6 pts.
9 pts.

A pts.
5 pts.
6 pts.

5 pts.
6 pts.
7 pts.

6 pts. 8 pts.
6 pts. 10 pts.
4 pts.
6 pts.

5 pts.
7 pts.

6 pts. 8 pts.
6 pts. 10 pts.
6
8
8
8
4

ptB. 7 pts.
pts 10 pts.
pts. 10 pts.
pts. 10 pts.
pts. 5 pts.

104.17.2.1. Appraisals on commercial or multifam
ily form reports shall be worth 75% of the points normally awarded for the appraisal.
104.17.2.2. An additional 2.5 points may be added
for appraisal of any proposed project which is per
formed from plans and specifications.
1993
61-2b-l through 61-2b-40

R162-105. Education Requirement
R162-105-1.
R162-105-2.
R162-105-3.
R162-105-4.
R162-105-5.

Course Credit.
Submission for Course Approval.
Education Review Committee.
Continuing Education.
Education Approved by Another State-
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R162-105-1. Course Credit
105.1. Education credit will be granted towards
registration/certification for an appraisal education
course which meets the following criteria:
105.1.1. The provider of an approved appraisal education course must be one of the following:
105.1.1.1. An accredited college, university, junior
college or community college.
105.1.1.2. A nationally recognized real estate appraisal or real estate related organization, society,
institute, or association.
105.1.1.3. A state or federal agency or commission.
105.1.1.4. Such other school or organization as approved by the Board.
105.1.2. The course content shall meet the minimum standards set forth in the State Approved
Course Outline.
105.1.2.1. A course must be at least fifteen (15)
hours in duration (including examination). An hour
is defined as 50 minutes of supervised contact by a
certified instructor within a 60 minute time period.
105.1.2.2. A final examination will be administered
at the end of each course pertinent to that education
offering.
105.1.3. Credit will be granted for a course taken
prior to July 1, 1990 where the applicant obtained
credit from the course provider by challenge examination without attending the course. Provision
105.1.4 will also apply.
105.1.3.1. The Board reserves the right to review
and approve the challenge examination.
105.1.4. Credit will not be given for duplicate or
highly comparable classes taken from different
course providers.
105.1.5. Credit will be given for appraisal classes
regardless of when the class was taken until July 1,
1992, at which time credit will be given for classes
taken only within ten years immediately preceding
registration/certification application.
105.1.5.1. Hourly credit for a course takenfroma
professional appraisal organization will be granted
based upon the Division approved list which verifies
hours for such courses.
105.1.6. Credit will only be granted for a course
that has been successfully completed. Successful completion of a course means that the applicant has attended a minimum of 90% of the scheduled class
hours, has completed all required exercises and assignments, and has achieved a passing score on a
course final examination.
105.1.7. All education requirements must be met
prior to applying for the pre-registration/certification
examination.
R162-105-2. Submission for Course Approval
105.2. It is the responsibility of the applicant to
establish that a particular education offering will
qualify to meet the education requirement for registration/certification.
105.2.1. For courses other than those originally certified by the Division for pre-registration/certification
purposes, the applicant shall submit on a form provided by the Division a list of the courses that documents the name of the course title, the name of the
sponsoring organization, the number of classroom
hours, and the date the course was completed.
105.2.1.1. The applicant will attest on a notarized
affidavit that the courses have been completed as documented.
105.2.1.2. The applicant will support the claim for
education credit if requested by the Division by providing proof of completion of the courses in the form
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A maximum of 300 points will be credited for any one I is prepared. A maximum of 100 points may be earned]
twelve month period.
I by desk review of appraisals.
I 104.9.2. Review of appraisals which includes a
R162-104-3. Time Allowed for Meeting Experi- I physical inspection of the property and verification of
ence Requirement.
the data, commonly known as a field review, shall be
104.3. Time Allowed for Meeting Experience Re- worth 50% of the points awarded to the appraisal if a
quirement. Credit will be given for appraisal experi- separate written review appraisal report is prepared
ence earned only within five years immediately pre- A maximum of 100 points may be earned byfieldI
ceding the certification application.
review of appraisals.
104.9.3. Supervision of appraisers. Supervision of'
R162-104-4. Proof of Experience.
104.4. Proof of Experience. The Division shall re- appraisers shall be worth 20% of the points awarded
quire the applicant to furnish the following informa- to the appraisal. A maximum of 100 points may be
tion for each appraisal for which points are claimed: earned by supervision of appraisers.
104.9.4. Not more than 50% of the total experience
Property address or legal description, date of the appraisal, type of property, and any other information required for certification may be granted under Subsections R162-104-9(l) through R162-104-9(3) and
deemed appropriate by the Division.
Sections R162-104-1K1) and R162-104-1K3) comR162-104-5. Compliance with USPAP and Li- bined.
censing Requirements.
<
104.5. No experience credit will be given for ap- R162-104-10. Condemnation Appraisals.
104.10. Condemnation appraisals shall be worth an
praisals which were performed in violation of Utah
additional 50% of the points normally awarded for
Law or the law of another jurisdiction.
104.5.1. No experience credit will be given for ap- the appraisal if the condemnation appraisal included
praisals performed after July 1, 1990 by Utah li- a before and after appraisal because of a partial takcensed appraisers unless the appraisals were done in ing of the property.
compliance with USPAP.
104.5.2. No experience credit will be given for ap- R162-104-11. Preliminary Valuation Estimates,
Comparative Market Analysis, Real Estate
praisals performed after July 1,1990 if the applicant
Consulting Services, and Other Real Estate
was not licensed as an appraiser in Utah, or in anExperience.
other state if licensure was required in that state, at
104.11.1. Preliminary valuation estimates, range of
the time the appraisal was performed.
value estimates or similar studies, and other real esR162-104-6. State-Certified Residential Appli- tate related experience gained by bankers, builders,
cants.
city planners and managers, or other individuals may
104.6. State-Certified Residential Applicants. Ap- be granted credit for up to 50% of the experience replicants applying for certification as State-Certified quired for certification in accordance with Section
Residential Appraisers must document at least 75% R162-104-16 of this rule, so long as the experience
of the points submitted from the Residential Experi- demonstrates to the Board that the applicant has the
ence Points Schedule. No more than 25% of the total ability to arrive at a fair market value of property
points submitted may be from the General Experi- and to properly document value conclusions.
ence Points Schedule.
104.11.2. Comparative market analysis by real estate licensees may be granted up to 100% experience
R162-104-7. State-Certified General Applicants.
credit toward certification in accordance with Section
104.7. State-Certified General Applicants. Appli- R162-104-16 of this rule, when the analysis is precants applying for certification as State-Certified pared in conformity with USPAP Standards Rules 1
General Appraisers may claim points for experience and 2 and the individual can demonstrate to the
from either the Residential Experience Points Schedule or the General Experience Points Schedule, so Board that he is using similar techniques as aplong as at least 200 points have been earned from the praisers to value properties and effectively utilize the
appraisal process.
General Experience Points Schedule.
104.11.3. Appraisal analysis, real estate counseling
or consulting services, and feasibility analysis/study
R162-104-8. Cumulative Points.
104.8. The cumulative points from instruction of will be awarded experience credit in accordance with
appraisal classes and appraisal textbook and article Section R162-104-16 of this rule for up to 50% of the
authorship shall not exceed 50% of the cumulative experience required toward certification so long as
the services were performed in accordance with
points submitted.
USPAP Standards Rules 4 and 5.
Rl62-104-9. Review or Supervision of Ap104.11.4. Not more than 50% of the total experipraisals.
ence required for certification may be granted under
104.9. Review or supervision of appraisals. Review Subsections R162-104-1K1) and R162-104-1K3) and
appraisals will be awarded experience credit when Sections R162-104-9U) through R162-104-9C3) comthe appraiser has performed technical review(s) of ap- bined.
praisals prepared by either employees, associates or
others, provided the appraiser complied with Uniform R162-104-12. Ad Valorem Appraisal and Benchmark Appraisal.
Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice Stan104.12. Ad valorem appraisal and benchmark apdards Rule 3 when the appraiser was required to comply with the rule. The following points shall be praisal by property type will earn the 6ame number of
points as fee appraisal where the individual can demawarded for review or supervision of appraisals:
104.9.1. Review of appraisals which does not in- onstrate that he performed highest and best use analclude a physical inspection of the property and verifi- ysis, developed the model in model specification, or
cation of the data, commonly known as a desk review, developed adjustments to the model in model calibrashall be worth 20% of the points awarded to the ap- tion, and where the individual can demonstrate the
praisal if a separate written review appraisal report appraisal was performed in accordance with Stan-
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105.4.4.1. Credit may be granted on a case by case
basis for teaching, program development, authorship
of textbooks, or similar activities which are determined by the Board to be equivalent to obtaining continuing education.
105.4.4.2. The Education Review Committee will
review claims of equivalent education and also alternative continuing education proposed to be used for
continuing education purposes.
R162-105-5. Education Approved by Another
State.
105.5. Credit will be granted toward the education
requirement for registration/certification or for the
renewal of certification for any education courses
which have been taken out of state and have been
approved by the appraiser licensing agency of another state as meeting the appraiser qualification criteria for registration/certification education or for
continuing education as defined by the Appraiser
Qualifications Board of the Appraisal Foundation.
1993
61-2b-8 through 61-2b-8(3)

R162-106. Professional Conduct.
R162-106-1.
R162-106-2.
R162-106-3.
R162-106-4.

Uniform Standards.
Use of Term "State Certified".
Size and Use of Seal.
Testimony by an Appraiser.

R162-106-1. Uniform Standards.
106.1. Uniform Standards. All appraisers registered or certified by the division must observe the
1993 edition of the Uniform Standards of Professional
Appraisal Practice (USPAP), which is hereby incorporated by reference. Copies of the USPAP may be
obtained from the Appraisal Foundation, 1029 Vermont Avenue N.W., Suite 900, Washington, D C
20005. Registered or certified appraisers, or candidates for registration or certification, may obtain copies from the division.
R162-106-2. Use of Term "State Certified".
106.2. Use of Term "State Certified". The terms
"State-Certified Residential Appraiser", "State-Certified General Appraiser", and "Senior Certified Appraiser" shall not be abbreviated or reduced to a letter or group of letters. If these terms are used on
letterhead or in advertising, the appraiser's certificate number must follow his name.
R162-106-3. Size and Use of Seal.
106.3. Size and Use of Seal.
106.3.1. When signing a certified appraisal report,
a state-certified appraiser shall place on at least the
certification page of his report, immediately below his
signature, the seal required by Utah Code Section
61-2b-17(3)(e).
106.3.2. The seal to be affixed on reports prepared
by state-certified appraisers shall contain the words
"Utah State-Certified Residential Appraiser" or
"Utah State-Certified General Appraiser" along with
the appraiser's certificate number and expiration
date. The zeros preceding the certificate number may
be deleted. The size of the seal, rectangular in shape,
shall be no larger than two and seven-eighths inches
long and five-eighths of an inch high including the
border. An example of the seal shall be made available on request at the Division offices.
106.3.3. The seal may be reproduced as a stamp
with ink that can be copied, or may be inserted by
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computer in an appraisal report at the appropriate
place.
R162-106-4. Testimony by an Appraiser.
106.4. Testimony. An appraiser who testifies as to
an appraisal opinion in a deposition or affidavit, or
before any court, public body, or hearing officer, shall
prepare a written appraisal report or a file memorandum prior to giving such testimony.
106.4.1. File memoranda. For the purpose of this
rule, a file memorandum shall include work sheets,
data sheets, the reasoning and conclusions upon
which the testimony is based, and other sufficient
information to demonstrate substantial compliance
with USPAP Standards Rule 2-2, or in the case of
mass appraisal, Standards Rule 6-7.
1993
61-2b-27

R162-109. Administrative
ings.
R162-109-1.
R162-109-2.
R162-109-3.
R162-109-4.
R162-109-5.
judicative

Proceed-

Formal Adjudicative Proceedings.
Informal Adjudicative Proceedings.
Hearings Not Required.
Hearings Permitted.
Procedures for Hearings in Informal AdProceedings.

R162-109-1. Formal Adjudicative Proceedings.
109.1. Any adjudicative proceeding as to the following matters shall be conducted on a formal basis:
109.1.1. the denial of an application for an initial
appraiser registration or certification for the reasons
listed in Utah Code Section 61-2b-29;
109.1.2. the denial of an application for reissuance
of an appraiser registration or certification for the
reasons listed in Utah Code Section 61-2b-29;
109.1.3. the revocation or suspension of an appraiser registration or certification;
109.1.4. the revocation or suspension of certification of appraisal courses, schools, or instructors;
109.1.5. the imposition of a fine against a registrant or certificate holder; or
109.1.6. any proceedings conducted subsequent to
the issuance of a cease and desist order or other emergency order.
R162-109-2. Informal Adjudicative Proceedings.
109.2.1. All adjudicative proceedings as to any
other matters not specifically designated as formal
adjudicative proceedings shall be conducted as informal adjudicative proceedings.
109.2.2. A hearing will be held in an informal adjudicative proceeding only if required or permitted by
the Appraiser Registration and Certification Act or
these rules.
109.2.3. A party is not required to file a written
answer to a notice of agency action from the Division
in an informal adjudicative proceeding.
109.2.4. All proceedings on applications for registration or certification as an appraiser, or for certification of appraisal courses, schools, or instructors,
will be conducted as informal adjudicative proceedings, except as provided in Section 9.1 of this rule.
109.2.5. All application forms which shall be filled
out and submitted to the Division for registration or
certification as an appraiser, or for certification of
courses, schools, or instructors, shall be deemed a request for agency action pursuant to the Utah Admin-

